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ABSTRACT:  
 
The European Union does not have an overarching body of criminal laws that defines 
conduct concretely and consistently throughout all of the 27 Member States. Instead, each 
of the Member States retains the power over their own criminal law systems, and applies 
Community law only on certain occasions when the EU legislates on specific criminal 
matters. For example, the EU’s attempt to fight terrorism and organized crime has 
resulted in Community legislation that requires the use Community-wide databases that 
gather, analyze, and share personal information on some EU citizens. The lack of an 
overarching penal system codifying legal definitions throughout the Community, along 
with the widely variant criminal law traditions of each Member State, results in the 
potential for EU citizens to be treated differently under Community law. This is 
specifically a threat in light of the use of databases, as Member States use them 
differently, resulting in unequal conditions and an unequal guarantee of the EU citizens’ 
Right to Privacy as defined by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
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AB VATANDAŞLARININ KIŞISEL YAŞAMLARI ÜZERINDEKI ETKISININ 
YAKINDAN ÍNCELENMESI ILE BERABER GENIŞLEYEN AB CEZA 
KANUNUNUN ETKISI 
 
Melis Atalay, MA Tez 2011 
Avrupa çalışmaları 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Ceza Kanunu, Temel Hakları, Veritabanı 
 
 
 
ÖZET:  
 
Avrupa Birliğinin 27 Üye Devletlerinin hepsini somut ve sürekli bir biçimde kapsayan bir 
ceza kanunu yoktur. Bunun yerine, her bir üye devlet kendi ceza kanununu 
kullanmaktadır ve AB sadece bazı özel durumlarda Ortaklık kanununu kullanmaktadır. 
Örneğin, AB’nin terörizm ve organize suçlarla savaş girişimi, AB vatandaşlarının kişisel 
bilgilerinin toplanmasına, analize edilmesine neden olmuştur ve bu bilgilerin başkaları ile 
paylaşılmasında kullanılan Cemiyet-çapında veritabanları yaratmıştır. Cemiyet çapında 
yasal bir tanımı sistemleştiren bir ceza sisteminin bulunmaması, her bir Üye Devletlerine 
ait geniş çapta değişik ceza kanunu gelenekleri ile beraber, AB vatandaşlarına Cemiyet 
kanunu çerçevesinde değişik bir şekilde davranılma potensiyeline neden olabilir. Bu 
durum, özellikle Üye Devletlerin veritabanlarını değişik bir şekilde kullanımı sonucunda, 
AB Vatandaşlarının Avrupa Temel Hakları Şartnamesinde tanımlanan Kişisel Haklarında 
eşitsizliğe uğramalarına neden olabilir. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
What is known today as the European Union started as a post-war community 
between six nations to pooling their industries of coal and steel production in efforts to 
render future wards less likely. Today, that Community has expanded to form a 
supranational organization that has substantial regulatory powers over many areas 
covering the economic, political, and legal structures of its 27 Member States. The 
considerable legal powers that the EU holds over its Member States today could not have 
been anticipated at its inception. Indeed, that unexpected quality of increasing 
competency is particularly true in the area of criminal law because there is no EU treaty 
basis for the harmonization of criminal law in the Member States.  
Why, then, does the expansion of EU criminal law competence continue to grow? 
The EU enacts criminal legislation regulating certain criminal measures when the 
variation of those criminal measures in different Member States’ negatively affects either 
the fundamental objectives of the Community, or negatively affects the functioning of the 
internal market. Clearly, in the context of free movement in the EU, if Country X had a 
more relaxed criminal law on money laundering for example than Country Y had, a 
criminal would likely commit the offence in Country X so as to avoid the more severe 
punishment. With freedoms that are the result of the abolition of internal borders and 
barriers is also the freedom of crime to move about. This is what some call the fifth 
freedom, namely, the free movement of crime. The unharmonized national legislation on 
money laundering consequently has the potential to negatively affect the value of the 
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Euro for the entirety of the Community. EU criminal competence aimed at harmonizing 
specific national criminal matters continues to grow in specific areas such as money 
laundering as necessary. While the EU lacks a normalized penal code that covers all 
crimes that occur within the Community, they do instead have competence to legislate 
over certain and specific matters over a wide area of issues.  
While community-wide criminal competence often grows in response to 
especially detrimental variations in national criminal code, the way in which the EU has 
achieved the high level of competence over such matters is problematic. It is problematic 
that many Member States were unaware when they signed the Treaties that so much of 
their national legal sovereignty would be encumbered by the Community’s interpretation 
of the Treaties’ as allowing competence over increasing areas of criminal matters. As 
such, I characterize this growth in EU competence as unexpected, and oftentimes, 
unwelcome. One instance in which this growth is particularly unwelcome is the 
Community’s recent legislation in the field of a centralized data retention system that is 
accessible by Member States’ officials and other competence authorities. The 
Community has sanctioned the use of Community-wide databases to prevent 
transnational issues like terrorism, organized crime, and so on. However, the mechanisms 
of use and control are unclear because of a lack of a transparent set of definitions that a 
typical all-encompassing criminal law system afforded by most governments would 
provide for.  
 In fact, much of what the observer can attribute with regard to the development 
and current EU usage of centralized databases can be seen with the development of EU 
criminal competence as a whole. Both the development of EU criminal competence and 
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that of centralized EU databases: have made rapid and sporadic developments even 
though the competence to govern over certain issues was not originally expressly 
available in the Treaties; have developed through creative and context-driven decisions of 
the European Court of Justice that oftentimes lacked detailed scrutiny of the legislation 
by Member States before it was passed forward; have ramifications that can potentially 
affect the fundamental values of EU Member States’ democratic societies and often raise 
serious constitutional questions in many states; and have either vague or completely 
undefined legal terms that leave massive room for legal interpretation. This last quality 
arguably results in the most problems for assuring rights for EU citizens, and will be the 
main argument of this thesis. Like EU criminal legislation in general, the legislation that 
pushes forward the use of EU-wide databases needs to have more clearly defined and 
consistent terminology, terminology that is linked with an overarching and 
understandable system of criminal law. The EU does not have a system of criminal law as 
such, and so legislation like that requiring a centralized data system in order to fight 
terrorism and other crimes is lacking a clear context to be situated in. A piece of criminal 
legislation needs to be a part of a whole system of criminal legislation in order to ensure 
fair and equal treatment for all EU citizens. This is because each EU Member State has a 
different concept of criminology, which results in each Member State using the the 
terminology present in the database legislation in disparate ways. The existence of an EU 
criminal law concept without clear and overarching definitions, and that that undefined 
criminal law concept requires the use of centralized databases which have the potential to 
affect the privacy of millions is unacceptable.  
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The EU is legally bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and so all 
Member States and EU Institutions are required to respect the guaranteed rights, 
including the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the Charter. In order to appraise 
the legality of the breach of privacy that results from the use of centralized databases, it is 
necessary to assess whether the databases’ breach is proportional to its aims to curb 
criminal activity. To do so, there must be clarity provided by concrete criminal law terms 
and definitions that are adopted on the EU-wide level. This will ensure that each Member 
State, even with their differing philosophies of criminal law, will use the databases 
equally and transparently. At present, without an EU-wide understanding of criminal law, 
this clarity does not exist, and the guarantee of the right to privacy cannot be guaranteed.   
This thesis will take the following trajectory. First, after discussing the basics of 
EU law and what is to be expected from a typical government’s criminal framework, I 
will go through a history of the EU treaties, specifically examining the content that was 
cited by ECJ when they creatively constructed Community competence for criminal law 
in certain areas. As such, landmark cases in which the ECJ did so will be detailed. 
Second, I will go over critically the current system of EU-wide databases, exposing the 
present system’s faults and inappropriate breaching of EU citizen’s fundamental rights, 
which are in part due to the vague nature and status of EU competence over criminal 
matters. Specifically, I will examine the suitability, necessity and proportionately of 
having a centralized data system that is widely accessible which are conditions that must 
be fulfilled in order for breaches of privacy to be legal. The last main portion of the thesis 
focuses on negative qualities of having a centralized EU criminal law framework in a 
certain number of criminal law areas, and then its positives. While an EU criminal law 
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competence is in fact necessary for the effective maintenance of the EU internal market, 
the fact that the EU lacks an overarching criminal law system that provides standards and 
norms of definitions means that equal treatment and the equal data protection of EU 
citizens is not guaranteed. 
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HOW IT WORKS:  
 
 
EU criminal law as a complete and comprehensive system that defines all 
criminal offences and all rules for its Member States does not exist. The Member States 
do indeed retain primary control over their national criminal law systems. They only need 
to follow Community law, which has supremacy and primacy over national law, in areas 
in which the EU legislates. EU criminal law as a comprehensive system is not necessarily 
and specifically mentioned in any of the Treaties or international agreements, whose 
content makes up the “primary legislation”. The only occasions that the EU does enjoy 
criminal law competence are those instances in which the EU has legislated secondary 
legislation through either binding legal instruments like regulations, directives, and 
decisions. As a unique combination of the Member States’ criminal systems 
supplemented by increasing Community-implemented criminal legislation, the EU 
occupies a vague and inconsistent competence over criminal law, potentially resulting in 
the unequal treatment of EU citizens throughout the Member States.  
 EU criminal law works by both EU jurisprudence as well as the EU instruments. 
Post-Lisbon, the Community law can issue instruments that require each Member State to 
harmonize with certain Community legislation. These instruments are: decisions, 
directives, and regulations. A decision is adopted either by the Council with co-decision 
powers of the European Parliament or by the Commission. The Decision can require a 
Member State or an EU citizen to take or refrain from taking a particular action. A 
directive is adopted by the Council with co-decision with the EP, or by the Commission 
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alone. Its main purpose is to align national legislation in areas where significant gaps 
keep EU law from functioning effectively. A directive is binding on all Member States as 
to the result to be achieved and the timeframe it must be achieved, but leaves them the 
choice of the method they adopt to achieve the Community objectives. If a directive has 
not been transposed into national legislation of a Member State on time, or if it has been 
transposed incompletely or inappropriately, citizens can directly appeal to the directive in 
question before the national courts. Directives are the main instruments that the EU uses 
to legislate upon criminal matters. This means that Member States’ largely variant 
approaches to criminality result in different approaches of implementing the directives. A 
regulation is adopted by the Council with co-decision of the EP, or by the Commission 
alone. It is a general measure that is binding in all of its parts. Regulations are different 
than the two previously explained instruments in that they are addressed to everyone. 
Regulations are directly applicable, which means that the law they create takes immediate 
effect in all the Member States in the same way as a national instruments, and without 
further action on the part of national authorities.  
EU criminal law further works by a combination of harmonization and mutual 
recognition. Mutual recognition is the acceptance of judgments issued by national 
criminal courts in another national court automatically and without any examination of 
the factual basis upon which the other court’s rulings were made. Mutual recognition 
works better if there is harmonization between Member States’ legal codes. 
Harmonization is necessary on two levels: harmonization of offences so as to avoid 
double criminality; and harmonization of procedural standards governing the legal state 
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of affairs primarily once a judgment has been recognized and executed (Mitselgas 2009, 
101).  
 Before we can speak of the European Union Community’s jurisdiction over 
criminal law matters, it is important to lay out a general understanding of a typical 
criminal justice system. This will provide a baseline for comparison with the 
supranational criminal framework that the European Community currently operates with.  
This understanding includes the basic ideas of what a criminal justice system is, and how 
it should function as an agreed upon system. Linda Groning believes that this baseline 
understanding was so cemented in western legal discourse that it is possible to speak of a 
“traditional model of criminal justice system” (Groning 2011, 118). The most basic way 
to explain this traditional model of a criminal justice system is to explain the system as 
the state’s legal apparatus for its use of public penal power. The state uses this 
mechanism to ensure order through the threat and use of punishment. Jareborg explains 
this as a “general preventative effect” (Jareborg 1988, 112).  
For it to function properly, the system must function as an agreed upon system of 
norms and an organization of institutions (Groning 2011, 118). The system of norms is 
made up of definitions of crimes, and concrete rules of criminal procedure. Hans Kelsen 
posits that traditionally for this to work, there needs to be a “monistic” system of rules 
that is founded in only one constitutional source; this ensures coherency and consistency. 
It is only with this coherency and consistency that it is possible to establish clearly what 
is right and wrong, and for the state’s citizens to act accordingly. (Groning 2011, 119) 
The current EU criminal law system that functions as a combination of Member States’ 
differing constitutions supplemented with EU Acqui Communitaire lacks this monistic 
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quality, and therefore does not function in the way a “traditional model of criminal justice 
system” does. It might thus provide for confusion due to incoherencies for EU citizens. It 
also has the danger to result in unequal treatment of EU citizens by different Member 
States’ enforcing officials.  
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CHAPTER II: HISTORY 
 
 
II.i. General Remarks and the Inchoate Formation of EU Criminal Law 
 
 The following history chapter will demonstrate the irregular way in which 
European Criminal law developed. It was neither fluid nor necessarily premeditated. It is 
in fact easily arguable that the Member States never intended to give the European 
Community as much competence over criminal law matters as it enjoys today. This 
further demonstrates that that competence is overly proportionate to what it should be.  
Additionally, this Chapter will show the select areas of criminal law that the EU has 
defined. To reemphasize, the criminal law areas that the EU has legislated upon are not 
backed up by an overarching system to provide clarity.  
Though most of the developments in Community criminal law have occurred 
within the past decade, it is necessary to trace its trajectory from the 1970s. Doing so will 
allow the observer to perceive the formative steps for criminal law cooperation that 
opened up space for an inclusive Acqui Communitaire of EU criminal law. Though this 
section is meant to provide an overall history, I will be sure to scrutinize the status of the 
third pillar, especially in relation to the first pillar. Doing so will allow us to examine the 
nature of the intergovernmental versus supranational governance power struggle, and 
assess the legitimacy of transferring third pillar intergovernmental matters including 
criminal matters, to the first pillar supranational category. 
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Harmonized action over criminal matters generally occurs when there are 
transnational problems that are better fought with common solutions. Starting in the 
1970s, EU Member States perceived the advantages of working together to fight the 
transnational problem of terrorism. This prompted the establishment of TREVI, which 
was a network established in 1976 (Vannerot 2009). It was informal in nature in that it 
had no specific requirements for its members, nor had it any specific infrastructure; 
instead it was an agreement for law administrative leaders of Justice and Interior 
Ministers of 12 Member States to meet when needed to discuss possible solutions and 
common actions for counter-terrorism issues. The incipient nature of TREVI exposes the 
tension of what the Community criminal law has become today: cooperation was initially 
spurred by efforts to brainstorm, and to discuss possible common solutions; it was not 
founded to enact common enforcement of national legislation that we see today. 
However, the discussion of possible common solutions was successful, and with 
increases in areas of common problems like drug and human trafficking for example, it 
made sense to expand dependence on TREVI further during the 1980s.  
The establishment of the common EU internal market had implications that 
influenced EU criminal law. The lack of internal borders made it easier for illegal 
substances to move throughout the EU. With the successful cooperation of TREVI as 
encouragement, the EU forged on with minimal supranational cooperation over criminal 
matters with the Palma Document that was made following the Madrid European Council 
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in 1989. The Palma Document recognized the potential ramifications of an EU without 
borders, and so recommended an intensification of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. The Palma Document encourages “inter-governmental cooperation to combat 
terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking and trafficking of all kinds” (“Palma 
Document Report”, 1989). To work inter-governmentally over such issues proved 
difficult in some situations. As the Report on the Palma Document reveals:  
In the course of the Group’s discussions it was recognized that differing views 
Were held on their legal and political framework…and where the competence for 
taking decisions and action lay. It was agreed to set those differences on one side” 
(Section 3, Palma Report).  
 
This shows how difficult it was for Member States’ officials to come together to agree on 
common definitions and priorities in the criminal law arena. The differences were set 
aside, meaning that they are not fully resolvable on an intergovernmental stage, and 
would rather necessitate a supranational framework to resolve those differences in 
national criminal law approach.  
Though the 1985 Schengen Agreement started independently of the Community 
framework, its integrative data sharing logic was extended to form the basis of much 
future EU criminal law. The Schengen Agreement was initially adopted between the 
Benelux countries, France and Germany. Opening borders within those countries entailed 
the necessity to strengthen the external borders. Hollander explains that a consequence of 
the abolition of checks at borders required “judicial authorities of EU member states [to 
intensify] the international cooperation in criminal matters” for reasons that were 
explained in the previous section (Hollander 2008, 54). The 1990 Schengen 
Implementing Convention included a wide range of provisions ensuring that stronghold, 
covering the areas of immigration, asylum, border controls, police cooperation and finally 
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a Schengen Information System. Indeed, the Schengen Acquis has since been 
incorporated into Community law, and has become an accepted norm guiding EU 
legislation. Mitsilegas asserts that this Schengen logic has set up a Community 
philosophy regarding criminal cooperation: “The Court has repeatedly examined criminal 
law in conjunction with free movement within the framework of an “area” of freedom, 
security and justice” (Mitselgas 2008, 8). It must be remembered that while only the 
initial six countries that founded the 1985 agreement agreed upon such a philosophy, it 
has since influenced the criminal law attitude throughout the whole community, without 
close scrutinizing of its content by all Member States. Moreover, the countries that today 
use this Schengen logic have stronger differences between them regarding criminology 
than did these initial six countries.  
The Money Laundering Directive of 1991 was the Community’s first attempt into 
a specific area of common criminalization. The initial proposal for the money-laundering 
Directive raised some important questions: did the EC Treaty contain an appropriate legal 
basis for the Community to define criminal offences; and likewise, could the Community 
appropriately define criminal sanctions? The proposal for the Directive read: “Making 
money laundering a criminal offence in the Member States, although it goes beyond the 
scope of the financial system, constitutes a necessary condition for any action to combat 
this phenomenon and in particular to permit cooperation between financial institutions” 
(OJ C106, 28 April 1990, p6, adapted from Mistelgas 2008, 66). However, because that 
right was not explicitly present in the Treaty, the final text read only that money 
laundering would be “prohibited” in Member States. This lead to a de facto 
criminalization of money laundering in Member States; it was not an explicitly agreed 
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upon common position of what that money laundering entailed, or how it should be 
penalized. Though the Commission attempted to justify legislating on criminal issues by 
citing the maintenance of a financial responsibility for the Community’s internal market, 
forcing national criminal systems to strictly conform to supranational policies was shot 
down. This is in stark contrast to the Community criminal law that we see of the last 
decade, which often cites the maintenance of the internal market as grounds for 
legislating on different areas of criminal issues. Indeed, a lot has changed since this 
inchoate beginning for EU criminal law competence.  
 
 
II.ii: The Maastricht Treaty and the Introduction of the Pillar System.  
 
 
 The Maastricht Treaty passed in 1992, and introduced a three-pillar structure for 
the European Union. The European Economic Community was renamed the European 
Community; it exercised supranational powers over first pillar issues, like the 
maintenance of the Community internal market. The European Communities of the first 
pillar constitute, in the words of a 1962 European Court of Justice declaration “a new 
legal order of international law”, and as being a “self-contained legal system” (Seibert 
2008, 94). The Community can legislative on issues that fall under the first pillar, but not 
the second and third, which were the Foreign and Security Pillar, and the Justice and 
Home Affairs Pillar, respectively. These pillars worked with an intergovernmental 
approach. Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty explains the third pillar, which is made up of 
provisions that relate to EU criminal law. It explains that the Union would together to 
cooperate on judicial affairs, customs and police management to combat terrorism, drug 
trafficking. It established the European Police Office (Europol) to do so.  
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The third pillar is additionally distinguishable from the first because the main 
actor is the Member State, not the Community. In the Maastricht Treaty, the exclusive 
competence of the national legislature in the field of criminal law was maintained 
(Albrecht and Braum 1999, 299). The form of international treaty law cooperation is set 
down in Article K3 para 2.A. the power of the Council is set as: devising common 
viewpoints on the initiative of the Member States (adapted from Albrecth and Braum, 
298). EU institutions lacked a precise and limited role with regard to the third pillar, most 
notably in the area of criminal law. The European Parliament, for example, was only to 
be “regularly informed of discussions” regarding third pillar matters, and could only “ask 
questions or make recommendations” (Article K.6). Moreover, only the Member States, 
and not the Commission as it did in first pillar matters, were granted the rights of 
initiative for criminal matters.  
Member States were bound to follow harmonized criminal laws only by 
international cooperation agreements, like Conventions. One notable Convention was the 
1995 Fraud Convention. To reemphasize, Member States did not act within the 
Communities but rather their actions are merely part of the Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters within the European Union. Therefore, these treaties 
only entered into force upon ratification by contracting parties, and so there is a maximal 
level of scrutiny on a case-by-case basis by each Member State, contrary to the way in 
which criminal law in the EU today operates and develops. Moreover, Member States 
may, during the implementation process, “express reservations and exempt themselves 
from different regulations causing lacunas again in the intended uniform protection” 
(Seibert 2008, 91).  In this context, the Community does not enjoy any means to enforce 
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its implementation; the European Court of Justice has no competences either. Hence, 
conventions were often less effective due to negotiation and were more time-consuming. 
For example, this 1995 Convention was not ratified by all Member States until 2002. 
However, they are agreed upon in full by each Member State, so perhaps they are more 
legitimate and function more properly by ensuring each Member States’ proper 
harmonization of the law.  
Though the introduction of the pillar system seemed to demarcate concretely that 
the Community had no competence to define criminal offences or introduce criminal 
sanctions, the European Commission continued to fight for the ability to have 
competence on third pillar criminal measures, which it argued necessary for the 
successful functioning of first pillar Community law. A key focus of the EC was the fight 
against fraud relating to the Community budget. For example, the EC funded a project 
that came up with what they called a Corpus Juris that defined some criminal offences 
and provisions on criminal procedure (Mitselgas 2008, 67). The EC pushed to adopt this 
Corpus Juris under first pillar legal basis, though this was in the end not successful. 
Again, this shows how carefully the Member States negotiated to keep their sovereignty 
over criminal issues, wanting to self-define its own usage of it. Just one allocation of 
third pillar matters to the first pillar framework would mean an environment in which the 
Community could assert its control over a variety of issues.  
The Maastricht Treaty is notable when examined in light of today’s EU’s 
competence over many areas of criminal law. The opening provision of Maastricht’s Title 
VI referred to only “cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs”, in contrast 
with the establishment of common policy on a number of other areas.  Mitselgas makes a 
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key distinction: “The emphasis [during the time of Maastricht] is not on integration and 
the creation of an overarching and powerful community competence on criminal law, but 
on helping collaboration on ‘matters of common interest’” (Mitselgas, 2008, 10). This 
was what was initially agreed upon by Member States, so it is remarkable that criminal 
law is so very different less than twenty years later.  
 
II.iii. The Amsterdam Treaty and Major Gains for Community Criminal Law 
Initiatives with Framework Decisions 
 
 
Negotiations aimed at making the three-pillar system more efficient resulted in 
the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
Maastricht third pillar areas of immigration, asylum, borders and civil law were 
transferred over to the first pillar. The third pillar’s name changed from “provisions on 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs” to “provisions on police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters”.  
The most important change is that the Treaty gives express power for the 
Community to develop legislation under certain areas of criminal matters that would 
necessarily be incorporated into Member State law. Article 29 TEU is the opening 
provision of Title VI, and it states that: 
Without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, the Union’s 
objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an areas of 
freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member 
States in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and by 
preventing and combating racism and xenophobia. 
That objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, 
organized or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences 
against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and 
fraud through…approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in 
the Member States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31 (e).  
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Article 31 (e) states that common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
entails “progressively adopting measures establishing minimum rules relating to the 
constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties in the field of organized crime, 
terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking”. This wording is broad and not specific. It is not 
clear, for example, whether the Community can adopt legislation in matters other than 
those relating to the constituent acts of offences and to penalties. Does this wording mean 
that the areas which the Community can legislate criminal acts and penalties cover only 
those named in Article 31(1)(e) – ie organized crime, terrorism and illicit drug 
trafficking? The vague character of these terms left wide room for the ECJ to maneuver 
and make creative judgments that gave more power to the Community than is explicitly 
expressly given in the Treaty. Moreover, because the wording was so broad, a clear and 
definite harmonization that might allow for equal interpretation of the legislation by 
Member States was not guaranteed.  
To accomplish that which is set out in Article 29, the Amsterdam Treaty 
introduces legal instruments, including Decisions and Framework decisions. Framework 
Decisions are in essence the third pillar equivalent to first pillar Directives in that they 
bind the Member States to the results to be achieved, but leave the Member States with 
the discretion of how they will achieve those results. They do not need to be ratified by 
the national parliaments, though they do have to be transposed into national laws within a 
particular time frame (Hollander 2008, 59). It must be noted though that Framework 
Decisions do not entail direct effect, whereas Directives do. The content of the 
Framework Decisions comprise of definitions of criminal offences, and are often also 
coupled with provisions on criminal penalties. Since the penal system of each EU 
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Member State is so different, Framework Decisions indicate only the minimum 
maximum penalty that Member States are obliged to adopt. They also often include rules 
on jurisdiction, for example a provision for victims. The Framework Decisions on 
terrorism, sexual exploitation on children and trafficking in human beings all include a 
victims provision, that call for assistance to be granted to victims’ families, etc, for 
example (Mitselgas 2008, 90). Technically, Framework Decisions have to be taken 
unanimously, (Article 34.2 EU Treaty), and without any significant involvement of the 
European Parliament. Every single Member State enjoys a “veto power” by which is can 
easily determine the pace of approximation (Seibert 2008, 107).   
Framework Decisions provide a stronger legal basis for the Community to enact 
on criminal matters, and help provide for approximation. The Community in fact has 
demonstrated a large area of competence to enact legislation with Framework Decisions 
on criminal matters. The wording from Article 31(1)(e) that was examined above indeed 
was stretched out over time by the Court to include a wide area of criminal acts. 
Mitselgas lists the scope of that harmonization:  
“such Framework Decisions [have harmonized] criminal offences and sanctions 
involve issues such as terrorism, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation 
of children and children pornography, drug trafficking, corruption in the private 
sector, attacks against information systems, counterfeiting the Euro and non-cash 
means of payment” (Mitselgas 2008, 86-7).  
 
As such, while the Member States did agree to the conditions set forth in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the vague terms regarding Community competence in criminal law rendered the 
Community with more power than might have been initially expected.  
Though with the Amsterdam Treaty decision-making still requires unanimity of 
the Council for third pillar law, and the Member States hold the power to enact laws, the 
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Treaty introduced some legal instruments, such as the use of common position, that 
increases the Union’s role. A common position is formulated by the Court, and the 
Member States are required to abide by it within international organizations and 
international conferences, thus strengthening the Union’s role in criminal matters 
regarding external action.  
 The Amsterdam Treaty increased the competence of some EU institutions’ roles 
in criminal matters. Whereas before it could do so only 6 out of the 9 areas covered by 
the third pillar, with the introduction of Amsterdam, the Commission now has the right 
over initiative over all areas of Justice and Home Affairs (Hollander 2008, 57). The right 
of initiative was with the Member States with Maastricht. The ECJ has jurisdiction to 
review the legality of framework decisions on grounds of lack of competence. Moreover, 
the ECJ has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the application of framework 
decisions and decisions, as well as the interpretation of conventions. By preliminary 
ruling, the ECJ can give an interpretation of the rules pertaining to mutual recognition as 
laid down in the various framework decisions. In giving its preliminary rulings, the ECJ 
directs the way in which the national courts apply the implementation legislation in each 
Member State. In this way, the ECJ potentially plays an important role in the 
development of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. (Borgers, 100-
101). If it functioned the way it was intended to, there would be perhaps more equalized 
interpretations by the Member States on how the EC legislated criminal rules should be 
transposed. There was some notable resistance by the Member States, though, to accept 
the jurisdiction. The UK has repeatedly called for the limits to the ECJ’s preliminary 
ruling jurisdiction, though the Community has forged on (Mitselgas 2008, 19). The 
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bizarre coexistence is indicative of the tension between national courts and the ECJ; 
cooperation has been very limited between the two, which has blocked successful 
approximation of supranational criminal matters. In applying the national rules by which 
framework decisions are transposed, national courts are required to apply the national law 
as far as possible in conformity with the relevant framework decision. In that context, the 
competence to request the European Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling is very 
important. The lack of cooperation has blocked this requesting in many instances. 
Consequently, less harmonization that would guarantee equal treatment of EU citizens 
under the legislation took place.  
The contested and complex trajectory of EU criminal law has been shaped by the 
ECJ court decisions. The next section will examine how much these court decisions have 
impacted the future of EU criminal law, and given the Community large gains in 
competence. However, without the a properly agreed upon manner in which to equally 
approximate the supranational legal competences in certain areas that the ECJ created in 
the following cases, there is undoubtedly unequal treatment of EU citizens by the unequal 
interpretation by each Member State. It is exemplary of how Community criminal law 
has sprung forth without stringent and explicit authorization of the Member States.  
 
II.iv. Tensions of Central Court Jurisdiction within the Amsterdam Framework 
 The Court has had to rule on cases that have been brought up due to ambiguities 
in the Amsterdam Treaty regarding first versus third pillar competences. Most often, 
there were extensive struggles regarding EU judicial protections in cases of cross-pillar 
initiatives. Union counter-terrorism measures are exemplary of this tension. These 
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measures at once have significant human rights implications, and their legal complexity 
transcends its ability to be housed in just one pillar. Moreover, union counter-terrorism 
measures are the merging of both internal and external criminal law as it involves the 
incorporation into Union law of international commitments. Mitselgas thus makes a 
distinction between two categories of situations: “instances where the Union legislator 
did not have any discretion in implementing UN measures; and instances where the EU 
legislator has some degree of discretion in implementation, by specifying individually the 
persons, groups and entities affected” (Mitsilegas 2008, 20). There is a gap where clear 
areas of effective judicial protection are defined, as well as a clear definition of how those 
affected can collect for damages caused by EU institutions wherein cases are cross-
pillared.  
 The ambiguity was resolved by the court itself, as illustrated in the judgment of 
case of Gestoras Pro Amnistia (Knook 2007). When the applicant applied for damages, 
the court used first pillar case law to a third pillar case, stating that this right exists 
because “it has to be possible to make subject to review by the Court a common position 
which, because of its content, has a scope going beyond that assigned by the EU Treaty to 
that kind of act” (Para 54 Gestoras). This shows how the Court has indeed gone beyond 
the Treaty constraints to provide effective judicial protection to individuals affected by 
far-reaching restrictive measures. While in this case it did indeed grant the individual 
protections and as such is a positive rather than a restrictive development, this Court 
decision is still indicative of the Court’s ability to interpret for itself, making its potential 
jurisdiction more far-reaching.  
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 Indeed, the many judgments related to the third pillar that have been passed have 
shaped the development of the principles of EU criminal law. Central to this was the 
interpretation of the reach of the ECJ regarding the determination of the applicability of 
first pillar principles to the third pillar. When the ECJ did indeed deem those principles to 
cross pillars, the relationship between the first and third pillar changed, making them 
more entangled, and more difficult to separate. I will now go over a few first pillar 
principles that were considered to cross over and apply to the third.  
 One trend that the observer sees is the conferral from first to third pillar in light of 
effectiveness. The Court confirmed first pillar competence twice: in the environmental 
crime and ship-pollution cases. They treated criminal law in these cases not as something 
confined to the third pillar, but treated those crimes as if in any field of law: what 
Mitselgas calls “a means to an end towards the effectiveness of Community law” 
(Mitselgas 2008, 24). While they may indeed work well to deter such crimes, this 
conferral to shore up effectiveness had considerable implications later in that they defined 
the Court’s jurisdiction to hold a broader scope. Both of these cases will be detailed in the 
subsequent sections.  
 Another ambiguity between first and third pillar law that resulted in a necessary 
transformation of the latter was centered on the issue of direct effect. Within the 
Amsterdam construction, Framework Decisions of the third pillar (that are meant to be 
comparable to the Directives of the first pillar) do not confer direct effect. With the 
exclusion of direct effect in framework decisions, there is also the exclusion of an 
opportunity before domestic courts for individuals to challenge their legal status and 
position resulting from ambiguities left by EU criminal legislation (Mitsilegas 2008, 26). 
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The landmark case of Pupino addressed this issue. It was the first case in which the Court 
was asked to interpret a framework decision adopted under the third pillar. The Italian 
Code of Criminal Procedure allowed children under 16 to testify under special procedures 
in contexts that were different from when the Community allowed a child under 16 to do 
so. The lack of approximation in this case is exemplary of the different treatment that EU 
citizens experience in procedure. The Court ruled that national courts under Community 
law are obligated to conform with third pillar Framework Decisions as well. As the court 
put it: “The binding character of framework decisions…places on national authorities, 
and particularly national courts, an obligation to interpret national law in conformity” 
(Para34), or something that is referred to by the Court as “loyal cooperation”. It was the 
Court’s opinion that irrespective of the degree of integration that was envisaged by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, it is intelligible that the writers of the Treaty would have allowed the 
Court to act in ways that would work towards their objectives. It ruled that framework 
decisions adopted on the basis of Article 34 of the EU Treaty have indirect effect and are 
to be interpreted harmoniously, bridging the constitutional divide between the European 
Community and third pillar orders (Hollander 2008, 59). This ensures similar procedural 
treatment of EU citizens, but still this is only guaranteed on legislation that the EU 
legislates. In other cases, national criminal law has to be reconciled with the 
approximated criminal law, and so still gaps between the experiences of EU citizens of 
different Member States occur.  
Borgers names the Pupino case as one that characterized definitively the legal 
nature of the third pillar. He posits four effects of the Pupino case as: the similarity 
between treaty law definitions of directives and framework decisions; the useful effect of 
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the preliminary ruling procedure under Art 35 EU Treaty; the development of the 
European Union into a cohesive and solitary organization; and the expression of the 
principle of loyal cooperation. (Borgers, 102). Mitselgas calls this an “ahistorical 
approach to European integration”, meaning that the Court goes beyond the original 
content that the Member States agreed to upon their signing the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Mitsilegas 2008, 27). According to Fletcher, the Court had to invoke rather inventive 
means to justify this ruling, since it misses any convincing textual support of the EU 
Treaty (Maria Fletcher 2005, 862).  “This has led to the criticism that in fact he Court 
confers not indirect, but direct effect to the Framework Decision – in stark breach of the 
working of Article 34 TEU” (Mitsilegas 2008, 29). This means that the omission of direct 
effect for Framework Decisions at the signing of Amsterdam was completely ignored, 
going against the explicit wishes of the Member States. This is exemplary of the rapid 
gains in the competence of EU criminal competence without express mention in the 
Treaties.  
 
II.v The Tampere Council and the European Arrest Warrant; the beginnings of 
Mutual Recognition  
 
Major strides establishing a Community criminal system were made with the 
Tampere Council of October 1999. The Tampere Council cleared up some ambiguities of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam through further agreements (Hollander 2008, 55). During the 
meeting the European Council set three important new goals: to extend cooperation 
between judicial authorities in the field of criminal law to all kinds of judgments in 
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criminal cases; to eliminate all material restrictions to that cooperation; and to simplify 
cooperative procedures (Hollander 2008, 55-6). It was at this Council that mutual 
recognition as a solution was emphasized (Spencer 2011, 10). Section IV of the 
Presidency Conclusions stated:  
The European Council therefore endorses the principles of mutual recognition 
which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both 
civil and criminal matters within the Union. The principle should apply to both 
judgments and to other decisions of judicial authorities (Section 35).  
 
The Treaty of Nice in 2001 created Eurojust in order to intensify judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Eurojust’s main task is to support and improve the coordination and 
investigations and prosecutions with regard to cooperation between national authorities in 
cases of cross border crime.  
 The first concrete step in the direction of mutual recognition was the 
establishment of the European Arrest Warrant of 2002 (Council Framework Decision 
June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures Between 
Member States (2002/584/JHA), OJ L 190/1. 2002). According to the then Belgian Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstadt, “The European Arrest Warrant will be for the European 
Justice and Home Affairs exactly as significant as the Euro will be for the economic and 
monetary union” (Wagner 2010). With this framework decision, an EU-wide system of 
extradition was introduced; under the EWA, if a certain number of conditions were met, 
extradition would take place automatically, within a stated set of time limits. Moreover, if 
the offence for which the person is wanted is one of the 32 listed in Article 2(2), the 
traditional “dual criminality” requirement is not needed: the requested State must hand 
the wanted person over, provided the offence carries at least three years’ imprisonment in 
the requesting state (Spencer 2011, 11). This means that potentially defendants could be 
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surrendered to a requesting state even if that offence is not punishable under the laws of 
the defendants’ country of nationality or residence. Again, this shows a huge area of 
potential unequal treatment of EU citizens. The data from the year post-EAW integration 
demonstrates how much change this establishment of mutual recognition brought about. 
Extradition was not only increased by 14%, but the average time changed too, as the 
average time between request and surrender was roughly a year pre-EAW, and became 
43 days the year thereafter (Wagner 2010).  
 There was some criticism in the press, especially in the UK, for forcing courts to 
send their citizens to face unfair trails for offences of which they are innocent, but it was 
generally regarded Community-wide as a big success (Spencer 2011, 12). It thereafter 
provided the Community proof of the success of mutual recognition, and set the context 
for future cooperation on criminal matters. In 2005 a Framework Decision extended the 
principle of mutual recognition to “financial penalties”, meaning that fines imposed by 
the court in one Member State are to be enforced in another (Council Framework 
Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to financial penalties OJ L 76/16 22.3.2005). . In 2006, a further 
Framework Decision was adopted to extend mutual recognition for confiscation orders 
(Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, OJ L 335/8, 11.11.2004). In 2008, 
two further Framework Decisions were adopted, one to enable prison sentences to be 
enforced in another Member State, and another to enable the same to be done with 
probation orders and other “alternative sanctions” (Council Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual 
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recognition to judgments in criminal matters involving deprivation of liberty (etc), OJ L 
327/27, 5/.12.2008, Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 
on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation 
decisions (etc), OJ L 337/102, 16.12.2008., all adapted from Spencer 2011, 13). The 
Community established a context of mutual recognition that invoked a symbolic 
environment of trust that was thrusted upon the Member States. This further was 
supported by the quickly burgeoning case law that encouraged Community aims to the 
detriment of Member States’ sovereignty over criminal matters.  
 There are some other problems inherent in the concept of a EU mutual 
recognition standard. Precisely, it is problematic that there is expected a quantified 
standard coupled with such qualitative auspices. The Action Plan on the Implementation 
of the Stockholm Programme has stated that “[Mutual recognition] can only function 
effectively on the basis of mutual trust among judges, legal professionals, businesses and 
citizens. Mutual trust requires minimum standards and a reinforced understanding of the 
different legal traditions and methods” (Action Plan, p4). It is not clear how to attain this 
mutual trust; it is merely stated that it is needed. How is it possible to have entities as 
common and numerous as citizens from differing countries trust each other fully? 
Therefore, one could readily suggest, as so many commentators already have, that 
criminal law (unlike the creation of an integrated market for economic freedoms) 
demands a common set of standards of general application (Herlin-Karnell 2009, 234). 
This currently does not exist between all Member States. Spencer, too, comments on 
some tensions inherent in mutual recognition in practice in the EU:  
It was introduced, as everybody knows, as an expedient to avoid ‘vertical 
solutions’, but the view has been expressed that mutual recognition can only work 
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when the laws of the countries concerned are broadly similar; and thus to make it 
work properly some radical and centrally-directed harmonization will be required 
– which is one of the things that mutual recognition was intended to avoid.  
 
Moreover, some Member States are not buying the concept of mutual recognition. 
It is a common view for some Member State officials, mutual recognition works as a 
guise that further pushes a supranational criminal law agenda. According to these critics, 
the furthering of mutual recognition causes an imbalance between law enforcement and 
individual rights simply because it pushes further integration forward without maximal 
scrutiny. This has led to problems in the transposition of European measures into national 
law and their application in day-to-day criminal law cooperation, (Wagner 2010). 
Wagner further explains that: “the European Arrest Warrant was challenged in the 
constitutional courts of various member states. Moreover, judges have frequently refused 
to follow the letter of the EAW and surrender persons without any check of dual 
criminality” (Wagner 2010). This of course hinders the effectiveness of the principles of 
mutual recognition and mutual trust on a Community-wide level.  
 
II.vi The Environmental Crime Case and the Tipping of the Scale as the 
Community Creates Competence to the Detriment of Member States’ Sovereignties  
 
The Environmental Crime Case is a landmark case in which the legality of the 
Community’s ability to determine third pillar criminal law was tested. Up until this case, 
it was commonly understood that the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(TEC) conferred no power to the Community to define criminal offences or prescribe 
criminal sanctions on a broad scale. The Council passed a framework decision on 
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environmental crime; that framework decision provided that certain conduct detrimental 
to the environment was to be made criminal by all Member States. Its terms followed 
closely those of a draft directive that was previously proposed by the Commission, which 
was rejected by a majority of Member States on the grounds that the legal basis upon 
which it was founded was inappropriate because it was not appropriate for the 
Community to make directives about third pillar matters (House of Lords 2006, 14).  In 
2003, the text of the directive was transposed and made into a framework decision that 
was adopted by the Council under the area of the third pillar. The European Commission 
thereafter filed an action for annulment of the framework decision, arguing that the third 
pillar measure was adopted under the wrong legal basis; it should have been adopted 
under the first pillar and as a directive that ensured direct effect, they argued. The 
Commission used criminal law as an auxiliary, meaning that they argued that they 
Community should have competence to prescribe criminal penalties if only to protect the 
Community’s first pillar environmental protection legislation.  
The Council and most Member States, though, opposed this view. Eleven of the 
fifteen Member States, including the UK, intervened in support of the Council (House of 
Lords 2006, 15). They asserted that the Community has no right to require Member 
States to impose criminal penalties from the content of framework decisions. There is 
nothing in the Treaty, they argued, that would allow for such a conferral of competence. 
Moreover the Council emphasized that TEU’s Part VI was devoted to judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and thus was clearly delineated from Community affairs, 
that the Court had not previously held that the Community was competent to harmonize 
criminal laws, and that the legislative practice of the Council had been to detach criminal 
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aspects of Community proposals and put them into framework decisions further proved 
this point, in their view (House of Lords 2006, 15).   
 The Court found in favor of the Commission. The Court stated that while neither 
criminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within Community competence in 
general, this does not prevent the EC legislature, “the application of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities [as] 
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences” (Paras 47-48, 
adapted from Hedemann-Robinson, 283). Again, the ruling made explicit that the 
Member States should define the criminal penalties to apply, so long as they are effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive (Para 49). The Court acknowledged that, in the case in 
question, criminal penalties were essential for combating serious environmental offences; 
such penalties could therefore be adopted on the basis of Article 175 of the EC Treaty 
and consequently could not be adopted on the basis of the third pillar (Hendemann-
Robinson, 284).  
 In this landmark case, the Court had to consider the relationship between 
Community law and the criminal law of Member States. The Court interpreted the 
Treaties creatively in order to establish Community competence. They focus on the 
effects of Articles 29 and 47 TEU, which state that third pillar action must be “without 
prejudice to the powers of the EC”, (Mitselgas 2008, 73). Though there was historical 
precedence which expressly excluded the possibility of Community legislation 
concerning criminal law, the Court declared that “it is not possible to infer from those 
provisions that, for the purpose of the implementation of environmental policy, any 
harmonization of criminal law, even as limited as that resulting from the framework 
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decision, must be ruled out even where it is necessary in order to ensure the effectiveness 
of Community law” (Judgment, para 52, adapted from Hendemann-Robinson, 288). This 
decision strengthened the Community pillar. “It thus sent a strong signal that third pillar 
action must not jeopardize Community action” (Mitselgas 2008, 73). What Mitselgas 
points to is that the Community objectives were placed before the objectives of retaining 
Member State’s sovereignty over criminal affairs. What is brought to the fore in the 
Court’s judgment is that the Community may have criminal law competence on the basis 
of the need to ensure effective achievement of the Community’s objectives. Criminal law 
is only to be thought of as a means to an end to achieve a Community objective; it is not 
necessarily a special area of law to which special rules must apply. “Criminal law will 
fall within Community competence, like any other field of law, if Community objectives 
are at stake” (Mitselgas 2008, 73).  
The question of whether the Community may declare its competence in criminal 
law under certain circumstances, or whether if only in cases involving environmental law 
remained unclear by the judgment of the case. The House of Lords noted “The fact that 
the Court did not expressly limit its judgment, that it described the environmental 
protection as ‘one of the essential objectives of the Community’, and that the reasoning 
applied by the Court to the environment would seem to be equally well capable of 
application to other areas of Community policy and action if they met the test of being 
“essential objectives” (House of Lords 2006, 18).  
Even to impose a Member State to enact some sort of criminal punishment is of 
course a challenge to state sovereignty. There is another troubling aspect to the Court’s 
decision. Mitselgas posits some that “it is paradoxical – and potentially incoherent – to 
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confer competence to define criminal offences and impose the criminalization of certain 
types of conduct but leave the choice of the sanctions to Member States” (Mitselgas 
2008, 74). This is the type of incoherency that precludes the ability for a monistic and 
reasoned system that characterizes the traditional criminal legal system explained in 
Section 1 of this chapter. Power was given to the Community, taken away from the 
Member States, and because it was incoherent, it was rewritten into the following Lisbon 
Treaty, thus cementing the conferral of competence. The criticism of the Environmental 
Crime case is still relevant, for it was with that case that the initial creation of 
Community competence over criminal law was allowed. Perhaps if the Court found 
against the Commission, criminal law competence creation would look very different 
today.  
 
II.vii: The Ship-Source Pollution Case 
 
The Ship-Source Pollution case was another landmark case that affirmed the 
scope of Community criminal law. It was another instance in which the institutions of the 
Commission, the Council and the European Pillar were in disagreement as to whether 
particular action falls within one pillar or another. The Commission again raised 
objection to a Framework Decision, arguing that parts of it should be housed again under 
the first pillar, and thus under subject to Community control (Case-440/05, Commission v 
Council ECR [2007] I-9097). An interesting feature of this case though, is that the 
Framework Decision was accompanied by a companion first pillar Directive, which 
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defined the conduct that was criminalized by the Framework Decision. 20 Member States 
intervened in support of the Council (Mitselgas 2006, 82).  
The Commission argued that the principles that were laid down by the Court in its 
Environmental Crime Judgment apply “in their entirety to other Community policies”, 
such as transportation policies (Para 28, adapted from Europa Summary 2007). Again, 
they argued that the Community may enact criminal measures insofar as it helps ensure 
the proper functioning of Community rules. “Such action may be based only on implied 
Community powers which are determined by the need to guarantee compliance with 
Community measures, but are not confined to criminal law measures in a certain area of 
law or a certain nature” (Para 29).  
On the opposing side, the Council argued that the common transport policy lacked 
the specificity and importance that the environmental protection issue had. The 
opposition argued that criminal law measures were not “necessary” for the Ship-source 
Pollution Framework as they were in the Environmental Protection case (Para 40). The 
Member States argued that the implied Criminal competence as was exercised in the 
Environmental Protection Case must be confined to measures that are absolutely 
“essential” for combating environmental offences, and that that competence should not 
extend beyond environmental protection to another common policy like transport policy 
(Para 41).  
The Court found in favor again with the Commission. It linked Community 
transport policy as sharing objectives with environmental protection. The Common 
Transport Policy, the Court argued, is one of the foundations of the Community (Para 
55). This was a reiteration of the finding in the Environmental Protection Case, namely 
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that when the application of criminal sanctions are effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive, the Community may require the Member States to establish such sanctions 
(Para 66). Again, criminal law is a means to an end, and in the ECJ’s view, is thus 
justified. Additionally, we see again that Community prerogatives are perceived by the 
Court as more important than maintaining Member State sovereignty in those specific 
areas. Moreover, in both the Ship-Source Pollution Case and the Environmental Crime 
Case, the overwhelming majority of Member States explicitly fought against giving the 
Community more power, especially on the grounds that the Treaty that they agreed to did 
not have express conferral of such power; in both cases, the Court ignored this fact. With 
this case, it became clear that the Community could potentially deem nearly everything 
related to the internal market under the first pillar, and thus under its control. Even before 
the Lisbon Treaty, the pillar system completely crumbled. Their discussions are very 
relevant for data retention, which I introduce now to remind the reader that the 
emergence of data retention will be an issue examined later in this paper. Since the Data 
Retention Directive which will be examined later aimed at harmonizing the obligation of 
private data companies to retain data, and thereby at eliminating obstacles to the internal 
market, the legal basis could be found in Article 95 of the former EC Treaty (the former 
first pillar). However, the issue could have been approached from the law enforcement 
side, arguing that the purpose for storing the data was combating serious crime, within 
the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the former EU 
Treaty (the former third pillar). With the judgment of Ship-Source Pollution Case, 
though, it became easier for the ECJ to effectively assert their own competence to 
legislate on data retention to combat criminal matters affecting the internal market.  
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II.viii The Lisbon Treaty  
 
The Lisbon Treaty is the amended version of what was called the “Reform 
Treaty”, indicating the overhaul of changes brought about by the new treaty. It was 
amended and signed in Lisbon, by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the 27 EU 
Member States on December 13, 2007. The Lisbon Treaty is the treaty that is in effect 
today.  
With the renovation brought about by the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
legal framework is divided into: one, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (which is 
an amended version of the Maastricht Treaty), which contains general constitutional 
provisions on foreign policy; and two, the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(which is an amended version of the Rome Treaty), which contains provisions on EU 
policies. The other major change brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is the abolition if 
the pillar system, collapsing the third pillar intergovernmental areas into the area of first 
pillar supranational control. EU criminal law previously housed in the third pillar is thus 
now “communitarised” and under the remit of a supranational approach. This is an 
improvement, because the previous pillar structure regularly raised discussions about the 
correct legal basis of an EU instrument in case a subject matter triggered EU competence 
in the different pillars, as seen in the preceding sections regarding the Court’s allocation 
of competence among different pillars. Now, the EU has the ability to legislate on 
criminal justice matters by the same processes, and using the same instruments, as it does 
for everything else. There is consequently less confusion and more transparency.  
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As such, the instruments previously identified with the first pillar, namely 
Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions, now apply for 
criminal and previously demarcated second and third pillar matters. Criminal law 
competence is expanded. The Community can now adopt rules on criminal sanctions 
instead of merely requiring Member States to adopt proportionate, effective, and 
dissuasive penalties. Framework Decisions are no longer used, and direct effect applies 
for legal instruments put in place regarding criminal matters.  This is of huge importance. 
Whereas before Framework Decisions required unanimity, which with 27 member states 
was often difficult to achieve, criminal law matters now may fall under directives, and so 
only need a qualified majority vote to be adopted.  
There are other major changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. Firstly, the 
European Union now has its own international legal personality that is separate from that 
of its Member States; this allows for it to act as a sovereign state in the international 
community of states, sign treaties with other nations, etc.  (TFEU Article 47). Along with 
this, Article 10 of Lisbon establishes EU Citizenship for all nationals of Member States.  
Articles 82 and 83 TFEU comprise the main provisions that make regulate EU 
criminal legislation in the Lisbon Treaty. They deal with procedural and substantive 
criminal law, respectively. Article 82 confirms the emphasis on mutual recognition as the 
main rule in EU criminal law. It contains the requirement of the respect of mutual 
recognition of judgments, and requires the approximation of the laws and regulations of 
Member States to match up to Community standards. To facilitate that mutual 
recognition, the European Parliament and the Council are entitled to establish minimum 
rules (Article 82(2)). The Union may do so only to the extent that it enhances mutual 
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recognition of judgments and police cooperation. Such rules must take into account the 
differences between the legal traditions and systems of Member States, but a definite way 
to do this is not mentioned, and so the community criminal legislation is undoubtedly 
transposed in different ways in each Member State.  
Article 83 TFEU stipulates that the EP and the Council have the competence to 
enact Directives that establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal law 
offences and sanctions in the area of particularly serious transnational crimes. A 
particularly serious crime is includes “terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and 
organized crime”, plus other types of crimes in the future decided upon by the Council, 
with the consent of the EP (Spencer 2011, 19). Moreover, Article 83 provides that there is 
a possibility to approximate to ensure effective implementation of a Union policy in an 
area which has already been subject to harmonization measures. Again, the reference of 
harmonizing when “necessary” is rather imprecise and so offers a degree of flexibility for 
the EC legislator (Herlin-Karnell, 231).  
Mutual recognition is emphasized as the main theme of EU criminal law to 
placate Member States’ concerns over their loss of sovereignty. This means that the EU 
maintains the position that they place superiority to mutual recognition over 
harmonization. However, there is no explicit listing of the Court’s limits, and as seen in 
the Pupino case, the Court can deem anything necessary to facilitate mutual recognition, 
and the interpretation is up to their own discretion. As Herlin-Karnell explains: 
The provision of Art. 83 TFEU [stipulates] a competence where necessary…[for] 
harmonization. [This] constitutes an imprecise threshold when allocating 
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competences. Although this provision still has to be tied to the principle of the 
attribution of powers and prove to be ‘necessary,’ there is reason to believe that 
the Court’s interpretation of it could, in practice, prove to be far-reaching. 
(Herlin-Karnell, 2009, 240) 
 
Article 84 TFEU also introduces a new area that is crime prevention. The 
European Parliament and the Council may co-decide to establish “measures to promote 
and support the action of Member States in the field of crime prevention”. This excludes 
any harmonization of the laws and regulations of Member States. 
 A general “communitarisation” of the third pillar has brought about other 
institutional changes. With Lisbon, decision-making is left up to co-decision procedure 
between the Council’s majority voting and the European Parliament. The EP has a 
considerable gain in responsibility. This decision-making pertains to law-making in the 
fields of mutual recognition and harmonization in criminal matters, framework legislation 
on restrictive measures regarding terrorism, crime prevention, the development of 
Europol and Eurojust, and police cooperation between national authorities (Article 258-
260 TFEU (Mitselgas 2008, 39)). The European Parliament also is now involved in the 
determination and the evaluation of the activities of Eurojust. Like the Court, the new 
Treaty uses “effectiveness” as justification for Union competence of criminal law.  
Additionally, the Court of Justice’s role has been changed in that it now has full 
jurisdiction to rule on infringement proceedings in criminal matters. The limitations 
placed on third pillar matters regarding preliminary rulings are also abolished with the 
Lisbon Treaty.  The Court also now has the jurisdiction to actions for compensation for 
damages and the review of legality; this reflects the general safeguards enacted due to the 
increased role of Community institutions in law and policy-making. Mitselgas sees this as 
a positive, clarifying that “Extending the Court’s jurisdiction on preliminary rulings in 
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particular will open new avenues enabling a dialogue between national courts and the 
ECJ on matters of constitutional significance such as the relationship between EU 
criminal law and domestic constitutional law” (Mitselgas 2008, 40). This will likely mean 
that there will be more harmonized transposition of Community law into Member States’ 
codes. However, this is only true for areas that the Community actually legislates on, and 
cannot provide for equal treatment for EU citizens.  
The Lisbon Treaty also inducts the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into Article 
VI of its Treaty, making it legally binding and attaining the same legal value as all EU 
Treaties. Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, TEU article 6(2) was the provision for 
fundamental rights in EU law. It stated that the EU “shall respect fundamental rights…as 
general principles of Community law” (Fieler 2010) Those rights were to be derived from 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as well 
as from the constitutional traditions that were common to Member States. With the 
Lisbon Treaty, “The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms, and principles set out in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union … which shall have the same legal 
value as the Treaties”. As such, the Charter and the guarantee of fundamental rights is 
part of primary EU law and all acts of secondary EU law, like Directives, have to 
conform to it (Feilder 2010). Not only must the EU institutions follow the Charter, but 
also national authorities must apply the Charter when they follow rules laid down in EU 
law. Judges in the Member States, under the guidance of the Court of Justice, have the 
power to ensure that the Charter is respected by the Member States only when they are 
implementing EU law. Individuals may also obtain compensation or damages if their 
rights under EU law are violated. Additionally, a subjective right to data protection was 
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included in Article 16 of the TFEU, creating a separate legal basis for EU instruments on 
the protection of personal data. With an eye on fundamental rights, a 2010 Commission 
Communication asserts that, “the Union must resist tendencies to treat security, justice, 
and fundamental rights in isolate from one another. They go hand in hand in a coherent 
approach to meet the challenges of today and they years to come” (European 
Commission 2011, 3). The Communication also asserts that the Union will ensure that 
the fundamental right to data protection is consistently applied. We will see whether this 
is true in the later section. This Charter appears to create the potential for new “rights”, 
and could create considerable confusion as to interpretation of human rights in Europe. 
We will see later how the emphasis on fundamental rights affects the legitimacy of data 
retention Directives.  
As can be expected from its previous relationship with the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam Treaties, the United Kingdom has negotiated an opt-out of the EU criminal 
law portions of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Of course, the Lisbon Treaty’s treatment of criminal law is not a complete 
overhaul of all intergovernmental elements previously found within the pillar system. In 
fact, Member States’ apprehension at creating a Community that has too much control 
over criminal law has resulted in compromise, and below I will explore how some 
intergovernmental elements still do remain. It must be noted, though, that the changes of 
Lisbon result in huge changes for the constitutional and national courts of Member States, 
so these intergovernmental “elements” may be seen as superficial by some.  
For example, the Lisbon Treaty repeatedly mentions respect for the diversity of national 
legal systems. Again, this only seems to work prime facie.  
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For example, there remain exceptions to the general “communitarisation” of the 
criminal law decision-making process. For example, unanimity is required in the Council 
for legislation that would expand upon criminal procedure, as well as on that which 
would expand the Union’s competence in harmonization of substantive criminal law. 
(ART 82(2) TFEU and Art 83(1) TFEU). Unanimity of the Council and consultation of 
the EP is necessary to adopt legislation establishing operational cooperation between 
national competent authorities, as well as conditions under which police and judicial 
authorities may work in another Member State’s territory (Art 87(3) TFEU and Art 89 
TFEU).  
The Lisbon Treaty also strongly asserts a Member State’s power to decide its own 
internal and national security (Art 4(2) TEU). Article 276 of TFEU clearly states under 
Title V that the Court will have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of 
operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State.  
Those who cite intergovernmental qualities of the Lisbon Treaty will point to the 
European Council, which is made up of one person from each of the 27 Member States. 
The Lisbon Treaty expressly recognized the European Council as an EU institution for 
the first time. The Council defines “the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational 
planning within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (ART 68 TFEU). As the 
European Council is made up of representatives from Member States, it is an 
intergovernmental council who determines the initiation of policy and strategy, as well as 
the initiation of legislation. It is important to note, though, that they share this right of 
initiative with the supranational Commission. 
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The Lisbon Treaty grants the option of a so-called “emergency break” in the 
adoption of Community directives in the field of criminal procedure and substantive 
criminal law. Member States can do so if they feel that the directive would substantially 
alter the fundamental characteristics of its criminal justice system. However, the only 
power that the Member States really do have in this procedure is to forward their 
disagreement to the European Council for consideration, making it more like a 
suggestion. Again, the Community holds the power, and not the Member States.  
The Lisbon Treaty also emphasizes subsidiarity of national parliaments and court 
systems. There exists a special provision on national parliaments and subsidiarity in Title 
V TFEU (Art 69 TFEU). This, along with the European Parliament’s increased role 
renders “the EU more accountable for its actions in the interests of the citizen and 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union”, according to a Commission 
Communication (Communication from the Commission to European Parliament 2010, 3).  
This provision places responsibility on national parliaments to ensure that legislative 
initiatives in criminal matters comply with the principles of subsidiarity. If the national 
parliament deems that it does not comply, the national parliament may exercise an “early 
warning mechanism”. They send EU institutions their reasoned opinion; if the reasoned 
opinion represents at least a simple majority of the votes allocated to national 
parliaments, the proposal must be reviewed, and the Commission may elect to maintain 
the proposal upon which time the Council and the EP examine whether negotiations 
should go ahead (Art 7 of the Protocol). The procedure is long and it is clear that it is 
unlikely that a reasoned opinion of one Member State should go on to affect real change 
with the Commission and the EP to get past. Similar to the “emergency break procedure” 
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discussed earlier, this does not allow the Member State with substantial power, with the 
real power resting with the Community. However, there is a slight move to devolving 
scrutiny of EU law to a national level, which is a step in the right direction.  
Exemplary of the superficiality of intergovernmental clauses of the Lisbon Treaty 
is the inclusion of “evaluation” of the implementation of EU criminal law by the Member 
States (Art 70 TFEU). However, how such evaluation should go about, and what impact 
it may have is unclear in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 70 refers to the evaluation by 
Member States with the involvement of the Commission; however, as Mitselgas points 
out, “the role of the latter, and the relationship between the Commission and Member 
States, is not clear (Mitselgas 2008, 52). It is also not clear whether all bodies of the EU, 
including the Fundamental Rights Agency, may be evaluated. Indeed, almost everything 
regarding this “evaluation” remains unclear: who will evaluate; what are the criteria for 
evaluation; what happens with the results of evaluation; what is the potential impact of 
evaluation? Mechanisms that prime facia guarantee intergovernmental qualities with 
reference to criminal law indeed seem more like fluff.  
Dr. Garret Fitzgerld is the former Irish Prime Minister, and in the Irish Times in 
June 2007 he expressed similar views regarding the Lisbon Treaty:  
The most striking change [between the EU Constitution in its older and newer 
version] is perhaps that in order to enable some governments to reassure their 
electorates that the changes will have no constitutional implications, the idea of a 
new and simpler treaty containing all the provisions governing the Union has now 
been dropped in favour of a huge series of individual amendments to two existing 
treaties. Virtual incomprehensibility has thus replaced the simplicity as the key 
approach to EU reform. As for the changes now proposed to be added to the 
constitutional treaty, most are presentational changes that have no practical 
effects. (European Center for Law and Justice 2008, 1).  
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II.ix BEYOND 
 
In a January 2011 Speech given in Maastricht, the Vice-President of the European 
Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Viviane Reding 
asserted that she wanted to create more “added value for the citizens of Europe” (Reding 
2011, 3). She proposed to do this by: improving procedural rights in criminal cases, 
setting out a strategic approach to criminal policy, and by ensuring coherence and 
consistency of EU criminal sanctions (Reding 2011, 3). It is only hoped that EU criminal 
policy will be developed with the necessity and proportionality principles in mind, 
especially since the trend has been, and the track she envisions, increasing centralization 
and supranational competence over criminal matters.  
 Slightly over 10 years ago, in a Euroepan Law Journal Article, Albrecht and 
Braum declared that “there is general agreement that, by reason of a lacking EU 
legislative competence, European criminal law, technically-speaking at least, does not 
exist as direct, binding law. In the field of criminal law, the national sovereignty of the 
Member States should remain inviolate. European law provisions confirm the absolute 
precedence of national sovereignty in the area of criminal law legislation” (Albrecht and 
Brau, 1999, 297-8). It is startling how wrong that assertion is today in light of what has 
come to pass. Most notably, the Court has taken liberties at making long-lasting decisions 
expanding supranational power to the expense of Member States’ legislative competence, 
even when Treaties did not substantiate such decisions. It is reasonable to believe, then, 
that the EU will gain even more power in the years to come, against the wishes of 
Member States.  
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CHAPTER III: DATABASES 
 
III.i Introduction and General Remarks 
 
The sheer amount of personal information that centralized databases hold on EU 
citizens is exemplary of the shifting tide of EU criminal law; it demonstrates that the EU 
has attained a previously unthinkable amount of competence that has the potential to 
impact all EU citizens’ private lives. Moreover, there are many different databases, just 
like there are many different provisions of EU criminal legislation; that is, there is no 
unified database like there is no unified EU criminal law that would facilitate clearer 
guidelines and expectations of how each Member State should use the databases. The 
increase of the EU’s stronghold over databases is significant and paradigmatic of both the 
quantity and quality of the EU competence over dictating criminal law. By quantity, I 
point to the manifold and broad powers that the EU holds. By quality, I point to the 
significant impact on EU citizens’ lives that this competence can cause. Additionally, like 
much of the development of EU criminal law, this right to data retention was not 
expressly given to the Community through Treaties, but rather developed in light of the 
Community’s assertion of its necessity to maintain central objectives and the functioning 
of the internal market. All of these qualities of EU databases make their existence 
questionable, and indeed potentially unlawful. Very recently, calls to amend the 
Directives that allow for a centralized mode of data collection have been seriously 
considered by the Community.  
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The emphasis of counter-terrorism measures in the past decades has led to the 
development of legal and technical mechanisms that serve to facilitate the collection, 
exchange and analysis of personal data of EU citizens. These mechanisms fall under two 
categories: eliminating obstacles to data sharing between national authorities, and 
creating EU-wide databases. The private sector has also been involved in EU-collection 
matters, leading to an overall trend of privatization of the collection, analysis and transfer 
of personal data. Though the Court calls on these measures to ensure the effective 
functioning of the EU in combating terrorism, the loss of privacy has major implications 
for EU citizens. Because each Member State stores and uses information differently, 
there is disparate treatment of EU citizens’ personal information. For example, in 2008 
the UK had 4.2 million people’s DNA on file; at that point in time, that database was 50 
times greater than its French equivalent (DNA data deal 'will create Big Brother Europe' 
2007). This results in an overrepresentation of UK citizens in the databases, skewing the 
information when used by national authorities from each of the Member States to imply 
something that is not correct.  
EU Databases allow for a central method of collection, analysis and exchange of 
personal data that can be used by the EU for a variety of reasons.  Some of these 
databases are linked with a special EU law enforcement body, like the Europol 
Information System, though many other databases exist as more centralized EU databases 
that are simply accessible by Member State officials. The major question regarding these 
databases is who has access to them, and just how many people have access to them. 
Another essential question that is asked is whether data sharing to the extent that the EU 
practices impinges upon rights of privacy, as guaranteed with the European Convention 
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of Human Rights. With widening access personal data privacy is at considerable danger. 
A third essential question is whether the EU is taking on a different attitude of collecting 
intelligence and becoming a police state. The following section will detail the history of 
the most significant databases used by the EU, and then will follow with why these 
databases pose problems for EU citizens fundamental rights and thus whether they are 
contradictory with the requirements of the Lisbon Treaty.  
  49
 
III.ii The Europol Information System 
Concurrent with Maastricht negotiations were the negotiations regarding the 
construction of the European Police Office (Europol) into an official EU body. The 
Europol Convention was signed in 1995 (OJ C316, 27 November 1995). It was not 
ratified by all Member States until 1998, and Europol was not able to start operations in 
the Hague until 1999. Since the 2009 Europol Decision, it has had a legal personality 
(Spencer 2011, 6). The tasks of Europol are outlined in Article 3 in the Convention:  
1. to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States 
2. to obtain, collate and analyze information and intelligence 
3. to notify competent authorities of the Member States without delay via the 
national units referred to in article 4 of information concerning them and of 
any connections identified between criminal offences 
4. to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant 
information to the national units 
5. to maintain a computerized system of collected information containing data 
6. to participate in a support capacity in joint investigation teams 
7. to ask the competent authorities of the Member States concerned to conduct or 
coordinate investigations in special cases (Convention, pp 10-11).  
 
Europol has intergovernmental features: its management board is composed of 
one representative per Member State, and each of those representatives has one vote. 
National authorities are sent to Europol in the Hague and there are Europol national units 
in each Member State. In regards to the national authorities that are sent to the Hague, the 
Convention states that liaison officers must be instructed by their national units “to 
represent the interests of the latter within Europol in accordance with the national law of 
the seconding Member State and in compliance with the provisions applicable to the 
administration of Europol” (Art 5(2), Convention, 14). This means that each national 
authority will work to further its own nation’s philosophy of how the database and its 
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analysis should be used. Though it mainly has the management of the Europol 
Information System as its function, Europol also has some limited operational policing 
abilities, like the ability granted in Article 7 to make a formal request for a Member State 
to take action in respect of a particular case (Spencer 2011, 7).  
The Europol Information System was established in 2005, but it was not until 
2008 that all bilateral agreements were signed by each Member State, allowing for the 
interconnection of computer networks between national authorities and Europol 
(Mitselgas 2008, 173). The basis for the push towards a common data sharing network 
comes from work following a Commission backed 1999 Falcone Study that was intended 
to assess the use of criminal records as a means of preventing organized crime in the area 
of money laundering (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 1). At this point it was clear that a 
need for centralized criminal data records had to do with maintaining the efficient study 
of the internal market. The study further revealed discrepancies between national criminal 
records in the following areas: the level of information available in the records, the types 
of persons with entries in national criminal records and the ground covered in these 
records (Stefanou 2008, 1). For example, there were very different national approaches to 
provisions on data erasure as similar crimes are punished by diverse levels of sanctions 
throughout the different national judicial systems. With this in light, the findings of the 
Falcone study showed a need for change in the EU-wide database systems.  
The Europol Information System contains information on individuals that have 
either been convicted for an offence that falls under the Europol’s mandate, those that are 
suspected of committing one of those offences, or those that have grounds to believing 
that they might commit one of those offences (Art 8(1) of the Europol Convention, 22). 
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Moreover, in opening Analysis Work Files (AWF), Europol may collect information on 
witnesses, victims, contacts, associates, and informers. The list of the potential collected 
is further expanded to include those third countries that cooperate with the Europol. The 
following personal data are available on the Europol information system, specifically to 
help complete AWFs: personal details, physical description, identification means 
(including forensic identification information like fingerprints, DNA results, voice 
profile, blood group, dental information), occupation and skills, economic and financial 
information, behavior data (including lifestyle, movements, places frequented, weapons, 
danger rating, specific risks, criminal-related traits and profiles, and drug abuse), contacts 
and associates, means of communication and transport, information related to criminal 
activities, references to other data bases (including those of public and private bodies) 
and information on legal persons (Art 6).  
Not only the director, deputy officers, liaison officers and experts of Member 
States may access the Europol Information System, but invited experts of third states and 
third bodies may also access AWF files; for example, the Director of Europol and the 
USA have an Agreement on the exchange of personal data, which allows American 
experts to access this wide-level of personal information of EU citizens (Mitselgas 2008, 
236). Mitselgas asserts that “[t]he precise rules and safeguards underlying a significant 
extension of access to Europol analysis files containing a wide range of personal data is 
left to an executive decision subject to minimal scrutiny and transparency” (as that 
executive decision is simply an invitation for third parties) (Mitselgas 2008, 174).  
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III.iii. The Schengen Information System 
 
The Schengen Implementing Convention was incorporated into EC law with the 
Amsterdam Treaty, and along with it, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was too. In 
1995, seven Member States worked within the SIS, and by 2001, 13 out of 15 member 
states did (UK and Ireland opted-out). The SIS has attained vast importance, as seen by 
the requirement to fit SIS parameters for the EU accession negotiations of 2004 and 2007 
enlargements (Mitselgas 2008, 238).  
Within the SIS framework, data is organized in the form of various alerts. Alerts 
may contain immigration data, or data related to police and judicial cooperation. These 
alerts may be made, for example: regarding third country nationals who should be denied 
entry into Schengen territory, on persons wanted for extradition to a Schengen state, on 
missing persons, on persons wanted as witnesses or for the purposes of prosecution or 
enforcement of sentences, on persons or vehicles to be placed under surveillance or 
subjected to specific checks, and on objects sought for the purpose of seizure or use in 
criminal proceedings (Mitselgas 2008, 237-8). From just 1994 to 2003, more than 15 
million records have been created on the SIS (Statewatch Analysis 2005). Even before 
the enlargement, at a time when only 15 participating states were privy to the SIS, there 
were over 125,000 access points.  
 Since its inception, the SIS has been ever expanding. In 2004, the Council 
adopted a first-pillar regulation and a third-pillar decision to introduce new functions for 
the SIS to fight terrorism (Reg 871/2004, [2004] OJ L162, 30 April 2004 and Decision 
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2005/211/JHA [2005] OJ L68, 15 March 2005, adapted from Mitselgas, 239). This move 
extended the access of SIS data to national judicial authorities and access to immigration 
data to people responsible for issuing visas and residence permits. The increase in the 
amount of national authorities that have access to the database increases the chance that 
information of the databases will be used unequally throughout the EU.  
More recently, there has been a move to establish SIS II, which is composed of a 
central EU system (Central SIS II) and a national system (N. SIS II). This will help to 
organize SIS, which currently covers both immigration and criminal law data. However, 
whereas before the SIS worked as a hit/no hit search function, SIS II will work more as a 
broader intelligence database. The SIS II provisions allow for the inclusion of biometrics, 
in the form of photographs and fingerprints (Art 20(3)(e) and (f) of the provision, adapted 
from Statewatch Analysis 2005). Whereas in SIS it was used only to confirm someone’s 
identity, in the future, biometrics will also be used for “one-to-many” searches, where 
biometric data of one person will be compared with the whole SIS database (Mitselgas 
2008, 240). This interlinking is a great departure of the initial hit/no hit search option. 
This is because the person is no longer assessed on the basis of data relating to him/her, 
but also regarding the basis of that person’s associations (Mitselgas 2008, 241). More 
generally, as the European Commission acknowledged, the functions of the SIS will be 
transformed “ from a reporting system to a reporting and investigation system” (my 
emphasis added, House of Lords European Union Committee, 2007). Like Community 
criminal provisions in general, the ever-expanding power and scope of SIS is a constant 
feature of data retention systems.  
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III.iv The Customs Information System 
 
In November 1995, a Convention was drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
TEU, on the use of information technology for customs purposes establishing the 
Customs Information System (CIS) (OJ C316, 27 November 1995). In 1997, a first pillar 
gegulation was set up to use CIS for mutual assistance in respect to customs and 
agricultural matters (Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97, OJ L82, 22 March 1997).  
After the ratification of all Member States, the CIS was itself launched in 2003 (Council 
doc 16245/07 Brussels, 9 January 2004, all adapted from Mitselgas 2008, 242).  
According to the CIS Convention, the CIS aims to “assist in preventing, 
investigating, and prosecuting serious contraventions of national laws by increasing, 
through the rapid dissemination of information, the effectiveness of the cooperation and 
control purposes of the customs administrations of Member States” (Art 2(2)). Both the 
Commission and a Committee consisting of representatives from the Customs 
Administrations manage the CIS. The CIS includes personal data, as well as if there are 
real indications that the person has committed, is in the process of committing, or will 
commit any serious contraventions of national laws (Art 5, all adapted from europa.eu, 
2006). This condition is overly broad, and so a large amount of innocent people may 
potentially be included in the CIS. The central database is available to all Member States 
– “it is noteworthy that these may include authorities other than customs administrations” 
(Mitselgas 2008, 244). This makes the assurance of equal and fair treatment of all EU 
citizens even more difficult to attain. 
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III.v. Interoperability  
 
There are certain recently established legal bases to help with the interoperability 
between different EU databases an/or EU agencies. For example, Europol has been 
granted access to the SIS. This trend is easily visible with regard to a 2004 European 
Council Declaration on combating terrorism issued shortly after the Madrid bombings, 
which linked the “war on terror” with the movement of people when it asserted that 
“improved border controls and document security play an important role in combating 
terrorism” (Pt 6, p7). To “combat terrorism”, the European Council stressed that “in order 
to exploit [information systems’] added value within their respective legal and technical 
frameworks in the prevention and fight against terrorism” there needed to be 
interoperability (pt 5, p7, “Declaration on Combating Terrorism, 2004). Again, we see 
expanding access to who has control of which data systems.  
 The Hague Programme that was adopted by the European Council in 2004 also 
maintained the link between movement, migration, and terrorism. They stated that 
the management of migration flows, including the fight against illegal 
immigration should be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security 
measures that effectively links visa application procedures and entry and exit 
procedures at external border crossings. Such measures are also of importance for 
the prevention and control of crime, in particular terrorism. In order to achieve 
this, a coherent approach and harmonized solutions in the EU on biometric 
identifiers and data are necessary (Para 1.7.2).  
 
The Commission was thereafter called upon to research and present its findings in a 
Communication detailing the ways in which synergy between data systems could benefit 
the combating of terrorism. The Communication was presented in 2005, and was entitled 
“the Communication on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies 
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among European databases in the area of justice and home affairs” (COM 2005). It is in 
this Communication that interoperability is defined as: “the ability of IT systems and of 
business processes they support to exchange data and to enhance the sharing of 
information and knowledge” (ibid, pg3).  Through this definition, interoperability is a 
technical, rather than legal concept. Mitselgas emphasizes that “the attempt to treat 
interoperability as a merely technical concept, while at the same time using the concept to 
enable maximum access to databases containing a wide range of personal data (which 
become even more sensitive with the sustained emphasis on biometrics) is striking” 
(Mitselgas 2008, 246). Indeed, to do so is to depoliticize an issue that can disturb the 
protection of fundamental rights as well as civil liberties. These databases were 
established for different purposes, as explored above, and so to blur the boundaries of 
each database and equivocate by doing so via interoperability is problematic.  
 The development of the Visa Information System (VIS) is a clear example of the 
inappropriate blurring of police and immigration databases. At once, the purpose of the 
system is to “contribute towards improving the administration of the common visa policy 
and towards internal security and combating terrorism” (Doc 5831/04). At that time, it 
called for VIS to be used by border guards as well as national authorities authorized by 
the Member States as diverse as “police departments, immigration departments and 
services responsible for internal security” (ibid). Many people that are not perhaps 
adequately trained in the reasons and philosophy of having such databases could thus 
misconstrue and misuse them. In 2005, the Justice and Home Affairs Council called for 
access to VIS to be given to national authorities responsible for “internal security” when 
exercising their powers in investigating, preventing and detecting criminal offences, 
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including terrorist acts and threats (Mitselgas 2008, 247). The Commission presented a 
separate third pillar proposal to this end, and the two texts were later linked and 
negotiated in parallel, which ended in a 2007 Council doc (Council Doc 10267/07 Presse 
125, adapted from Mitselgas 2008, 247). Moreover, there are bridging clauses that allow 
Europol to access VIS within the limits of its mandate (Art 3(1)).  
VIS, though developed for immigration purposes, now contains information on 
people that engage in lawful activity, like applying for a visa or for asylum, and which 
holds information that can be accessed by a wide range of police authorities. This runs 
counter to proportionality principles that must be guaranteed that will be examined in 
detail later. Mitselgas notes an aspect more troubling of this development: “They signify 
the elimination of the distinction between innocent and suspect activity under a maximum 
securitization approach, whereby the quest for security justifies the maximum collection 
and exchange of personal data, regardless of their nature” (Mitselgas 2008, 249). This 
trend is not ending, but instead is burgeoning, which is troubling indeed to the necessary 
scrutiny when passing measures to expand the retention and sharing of personal data 
throughout the EU.  
What is additionally alarming is preference for timely data over mutual assistance. 
The Commission affirmed it acceptable to bypass mutual legal assistance practices by 
allowing national authorities direct and automatic access to information. The Council 
Decision of 2005 on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist 
offences required the appointment of a specialist law enforcement unit in each Member 
State. This unit was to coordinate the automatic transfer of data on terrorist-related 
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prosecutions and convictions to Europol, Eurojust and other Member States via the 
specially appointed contact point in Eurojust (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 13).] 
 
 
 
III.vi  Exchange of Data Between National Authorities & The Principles of 
Availability  
The proliferation of the exchange of data between national authorities occurs most 
often in the field of police cooperation, mutual legal assistance, and legal cooperation. 
This is pushed forward by the principle of availability, which will be explained below. 
However, a major problem with this international cooperation exists: police authorities 
from different Member States make up different niches in each nation’s constitutional 
makeup; while some nations’ police forces are expected to make up a huge portion of that 
nation’s maintenance of legality, other nations’ police forces are less expected to do so. 
This results in the potential unequal treatment and coverage by the EU law for EU 
citizens coming from different Member States.  
The Principle of Availability was laid out in the Hague Programme. It states that  
Throughout the Union, a law enforcement officer in one Member State who needs 
information in order to perform his duties can obtain this from another Member 
State and that the law enforcement agency in the other Member State which holds 
this information will make it available for the stated purpose, taking into account 
the requirement for ongoing investigations in that State (Point 2.1, pg 27, the 
Hague Programme, 2005).  
 
In effect, this gives national law enforcement agencies within the EU full access to all 
data in all national and European databases.  The principle is based on a maximal version 
of mutual recognition. This recognition of the impact of the principle of availability is 
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essential. There are very few grounds for refusal, and the exchange of information is 
almost automatic. The Programme says that the information is to be handed made 
automatically available to “equivalent” authorities of other Member States (Art 14, 
2005). But how is it possible to determine equivalent authorities when each nation has a 
different conception of police authority? Mitselgas points out that the proposal “does not 
require a level of equivalence between such authorities, but equivalence is to be defined 
by a comitology procedure, thus evading full parliamentary scrutiny” (Mitselgas 2008, 
258). This is a problem of all EU-wide databases; different nations’ perceptions of data 
usage are different, so supposing that availability will work without deeper examination 
of who should make up “equivalents” from each Member State, etc., will result in the 
incorrect and unequal usage of the database information.  
 As the European data protection authorities put it in their statement from their 
meeting in Cyprus in May 2007: 
In view of the increasing use of availability of information as a concept for 
improving the fight against serious crime and the use of this concept both on a 
national level and between Member States, the lack of a harmonized and high 
level of data protection regime in the Union creates a situation in which the 
fundamental right of protection of personal data is not sufficiently guaranteed 
anymore (http://www.cnpd.pt/bin/relacoes/declaration.pdf). 
 
Before handing over data, evidence, or suspects, the police and judiciary of one state used 
to be required to believe firmly that the police and judiciary of the requesting state would 
respect the rights of its nationals. Now, with the principle of availability, there is less 
scrutiny as to whether the requesting state will treat the personal data with the same 
consideration and protection that is afforded in the requested state. By transferring such 
data, the police and judiciary of one state potentially put their citizens at risk of being 
investigated, tried and imprisoned in another state. This requires a great deal of 
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confidence in the fairness of the requesting state’s criminal justice system (Bignami 
2007, 237).  
The proposal for this sort of data exchange was tabled in 2005, but the move 
towards the principle of availability remained on some Member States’ minds, which led 
to an agreement on enhancing police cooperation outside the EU framework. Namely, 
seven EU Member States (Belgium, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Germany, Austria, and 
the Netherlands) signed the Prum Convention in 2007 (Council Document 10900/05, 
Brussels, 7 July 2005). The Prum Convention proposes among other things the 
establishment of national DNA analysis files and the automated search and comparison of 
DNA profiles and fingerprinting data (Mitselgas 2008, 259). 
 In 2007, the Justice and Home Affairs Council agreed to integrate major parts of 
the Prum Convention into the EU legal framework, asserting that:  
the special value of the Treaty lies in the substantially improved and efficiently 
organized procedures for the exchange of information. The states involved may 
now give one another automatic access to specific national databases. This 
amounts to a quantum leap in the cross-border sharing of information (Justice and 
Home Affairs Council 2007, 7).  
 
The content of Prum was formalized by Decision 2008/615/JHA “on the stepping up of 
cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime”, 
OJ L210, 6 August 2008. The proposal, like Prum, requires Member States to establish 
national DNA analysis files for the investigation of criminal offences (Art2 (1)). 
Automated searching and comparison of both fingerprint data and vehicle registration is 
also allowed (Art 9 and 12). This is significant because each Member State is required to 
establish such databases without any domestic debate or real domestic scrutiny. Mitselgas 
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points out another huge drawback regarding differing approaches of different Member 
States:  
“the proposal does not specify what kind of data could be included in DNA or 
fingerprint databases. This may lead to substantial discrepancies in national 
approaches, with some Member States including data only of persons convicted of 
serious crimes, and others including data on a wide range of individuals, including 
suspects or persons subject to disqualifications” (Mitselgas 2008, 261).   
 
For example, even as recent as 2008, the UK had 4.2 million people’s DNA on file (7% 
of their population, and surprisingly enough 750,000 of which are taken from under 16s); 
at that point in time, that database was 50 times greater than its French equivalent (DNA 
data deal 'will create Big Brother Europe' 2007). . This is likely because, as the aforecited 
article asserts, “Britain gives its police greater freedom to obtain, use and store genetic 
information than other countries, who remove the profiles if the person is acquitted or not 
charged”. It is thus problematic, as then UK Liberal Democrat spokesman David Heath 
explained, “to be sharing information about innocent citizens” with countries that do not 
normally record their own nationals’ as such; it distorts the information at hand for 
Member States that do not normally retain such a huge level of information.  
One source of data that has been recently shared between police forces of 
Member States is criminal records. The Commission’s proposal for a Council Decision 
came in October 2004 with a call for urgent measures justified by reference to the 
terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid, and the Belgian pedophilia cases (Proposal 
…2004, 664). This first gained legality with the 2005 third pillar Decision “on the 
exchange of information extracted from the criminal record” (Council Decision 2005). 
Through this Decision, a central authority was designated in each Member State that was 
to inform other Member States’ central authorities of criminal convictions of their 
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nationals, and answer any questions posed by other Member States, including supplying 
criminal record data (Art 1-3). 
 The Swedish government initially spurred the exchange of information between 
police authorities. The Swedish government stated: 
that a national competence to detect, prevent or investigate a crime or criminal 
activity attributed to a national authority by national law should be recognized by 
other Member States and constitute a right to request and obtain information and 
intelligence available in other Member States without any other formal 
requirements than those laid down in the Framework Decision (my emphasis 
added, Explanatory Memorandum 2004.).  
 
A framework decision facilitating the exchange of information and intelligence between 
authorities in Member States was passed in 2006 (Council Framework Decision 2006). 
Article I of this Decision declares its purpose to “establish the rules under which Member 
States’ law enforcement authorities may exchange existing information and intelligence 
effectively and expeditiously for the purpose of conducting criminal investigations or 
criminal intelligence operations” (Article1.1). This objective is broad; what is meant by 
information and intelligence, who are the law enforcement authorities, and what 
constitutes criminal investigations? The vagueness in these terms will obviously have the 
result of having each Member State construe those terms differently. Though it is not 
clearly defined and quite broad, there are some caveats. The Member States are not 
required to gather and store information solely for the purpose of providing it to other 
Member States, for example (Art1 (3)).  
 In general, requests along with the details to substantiate the request are made 
from one Member State to another (art 5). There is also a safeguard of the principle of 
equivalence with the exchange of information: the requesting Member State authority 
must ensure that conditions are not stricter than those applicable at national level for 
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providing and requesting information to these authorities (Art 3(3)). In order to acquire 
requested data, the offence to which the request refers must be considered a criminal 
offence in both Member States. However, substantive criminal provisions are notoriously 
different to juxtapose, especially when the offences that are not purely criminal, like 
administrative offences that may lead to criminal prosecution in one state, but not in 
another (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 8). The requested information can be refused on 
grounds of endangering national security interests of the requested country (Art 10 (1)-
(3)).  
As has been previously noted, the sharing of criminal records is problematic since 
all Member States have different systems of drafting criminal records. In Austria, Ireland, 
Sweden and the UK, police authorities keep criminal record archives, whereas in 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Spain criminal records are placed with 
the Ministry of Justice (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 28). Additionally, some Member 
States include certain information, for example, while others do not include that 
information Another area in which there are differences between Member States is 
wherein if a Member State’s police force is not allowed to get some information in their 
own Member State, can it not just get the information from authorities in other member 
states? Moreover, this system allows for national authorities to circumvent limitations in 
their domestic law by obtaining information by authorities in other Member States where 
the law does not provide for equivalent safeguards of coercive measures for 
investigations, for example. Also, what happens to the persona data once it has been 
transmitted to another authority? These questions are essential to ask because the 
fundamental right of privacy is involved, and the answers to these questions might be in 
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part the answer to ensuring equal treatment under the database system for all EU citizens. 
Each of these issues is affected further still by the involvement of the private sector in 
collecting EU citizens’ private data at the request of the Community. In the next Chapter, 
I will survey the ramifications of having the private sector as a definitive actor in the 
collection of private data.  
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CHAPTER IV: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND DATABASES 
 
Private companies have been called upon to cooperate with state authorities to 
help them fight crime. Specifically, data retention in this field refers to the obligation put 
on providers of public communications networks to retain traffic and location data as 
well as related data necessary to identify the subscriber. The private sector may get 
involved by reporting information to authorities if they suspect suspicious activity, 
retaining data that has already been collected, or extending information collected for 
business purposes to public authorities. I will explore and give an example of each of 
these mechanisms. All instances reconfigure the relationship between the private and the 
public. All areas of information that are transmitted from the private sector to the EU 
State involve everyday activities that are very legitimate, such as air traveling, making 
credit card payments, etc. Regarding the information transmitted from the private sphere, 
the emphasis is on prevention and suspicion, and indeed, profiling, which turns the EU 
into somewhat of an intelligence-seeking potential police state. Commissioner 
Hammarberg has reported that troublingly,  
These systems no longer just watch: companies and governments have developed, 
or are developing, software that supposedly identifies “suspicious behaviour” and 
even whether a person has “hostile intent”. Surveillance computers don’t just 
survey : they direct the attention of police and other authorities to specific “ 
targets” (Hammarberg 2008, 2).  
 
This means that there is very little active consideration to determine whether a person 
should be “targeted”, and this may lead to distortions that unjustly will lead to the privacy 
of an individual being wholly invaded. Additionally the private sector from different 
Member States have different cultures regarding data protection and criminology in 
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general, so they may report varying amounts of information to the public sector. Whereas 
the Member State government authorities might have some, even if minimal, training on 
how an EU-wide database system should work, the private sector is expected to have 
even less of this training, which results in even more unequal treatment of EU citizens’ 
private information under the database system.  
The following will detail some of the most important areas in which the private sector is 
required to give information to the public sector.  
 
IV.i Financial Intelligence Units  
 
 An instance in which the private sector reports suspicious activities to public 
authorities is in the case of financial intelligence units reporting suspicious banking 
transactions (FIUs). As stated earlier, anti-money-laundering initiatives have been a 
priority of the EU’s criminal legislation. There has since been legislation obliging banks, 
the financial sector, and other professionals for many duties to assist the fight against 
money laundering. Some of these duties are: customer identification and record keeping 
duties, and the reporting of suspicious transactions (Mitselgas 2008, 263). It should be 
noted that this poses a problem for lawyers who are obliged to report suspicions of 
money-laundering that runs counter to the assurance of client-attorney confidentiality 
agreements.  
 In 2000, the Member States adopted a third pillar decision on the cooperation 
between financial intelligence units (OJ L271, 24 October 2000). It was enacted in order 
to address the differing national models of domestic anti-money-laundering frameworks. 
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This decision required each Member State to set up a financial intelligence unit that 
would receive and process reported suspicions of money-laundering, and included 
provisions that would enable these FIUs to exchange information with ease.  
 Thereafter, in 2005 the EU adopted a money-laundering directive (Directive 
2005/60/EC 2005). This is a first pillar directive has provision that detail the FIUs, with 
maximum powers of access to national databases; Member States are obligated to ensure 
that the FIUs have access to the financial, administrative and law enforcement 
information that they require to properly fulfill their tasks (Art 21(3)). This has the 
potential to transform the FIUs from filtering bodies to investigative bodies.  
 
 
IV.ii TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
 
 Telecommunication is another area with which the private sector assists the EU 
State to find information for the purpose of combating international crime. A 2002 first 
pillar directive was passed regarding the erasure of communications data (Directive 
2002/58/EC, OJ L201, 2002 p37).  However, Community authorities attempting to 
prevent organized crime vied for the public sector to retain some electronic 
communications (Conclusion December 2002). Following the 2004 Madrid bombings, 
the European Council instructed the Council to examine proposals for obliging data 
providers to retain some telecommunications and the 2002 first pillar directive on erasure 
became irrelevant.  
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Thereafter, a framework decision on data retention was co-opted between France, 
Sweden, the UK and Ireland (council doc. 8958/04 Brussels, 28 April 2004). As there 
was difficulty to get agreement by unanimity off the ground, the proposal was relaunched 
as a directive that was formally adopted under an Article 95 EC (internal market) legal 
basis in 2006 (Directive 2004/24/EC 2006). While the grounds of this measure are indeed 
given by the necessity of internal market protection, the text and this purpose make it 
clear that it is meant to combat criminal behavior on a large scale. It should not have been 
passed under the guise of first pillar, but should have remained under third pillar, which 
would have of course required the unanimity of all Member States for it to get approved.  
With this directive, a move was made to harmonize Member States’ data retention 
provisions “in order to ensure that the data are available for the purpose of investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its 
national law” (Art 1(1)). That is any serious crime, not just crimes related to money 
laundering, organized crime, or terrorism. The qualification for “serious crime” is left up 
to the interpretation of each Member State, again leaving room for unequal treatment of 
data throughout the EU. Telecommunication providers must retain data for periods “no 
less than six months and not more than two years from the date of the communication” 
(Art 6).  This includes personal everyday data. Though the directive asserts that only 
competent authorities may access the telecommunications data, it is not specified just 
who may be a part of that group of competent authorities (Art 4). That such a wide area 
of data should be accessible by an undefined and potentially large group of people brings 
fundamental rights, especially the right to privacy, into issue. Again like most directives, 
the Data Retention Directive contained no further rules on the conditions under which 
  69
competent national authorities can access the retained data. This is left to the discretion of 
the Member States and falls outside the scope of the directive.  
Thereafter, the European Union formally adopted Directive 2006/24/EC on “the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC”. Similar to the 2002 Directive, Member States must 
require their communications providers to retain certain telecommunications information 
for a period of 6 months to 2 years. The following data must be retained: the source of the 
communication; the destinations of the communication; the date, time and duration of a 
communication; the type of communication; the communication device; the location of 
mobile communication equipment. This directive covers: fixed telephony, mobile 
telephony, Internet access; Internet email; and Internet telephony. Essentially, law 
enforcement authorities have access to everything a customer would see on a typical 
phone bill statement, like the time and duration of the call, the customer name, and 
numbers called. Also, in the case of Internet data retention, the law enforcement could 
request a superficial image of an email account’s inbox and sent folder (excluding the 
contents of the emails). Member States also have the freedom under Article 15(1) to 
legislate official access to the retained data for purposes other than those provided in the 
Directive. For example, Germany has made data admissible in certain civil copyright 
cases.  
It is essential to realize just how much personal information is passed through 
telecommunications networks in today’s information-oriented society. Patients consult 
doctors via telephone, troubled victims consult crisis lines, clients consult attorneys. 
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Moreover, in the case of mobile phones, a person’s movement via geographic location 
tracking can be followed (Breyer 2005, 1). In the 2008-2009 year alone, two million data 
access requests were made (Ozimek 2011). Breyer names the emerging trend to track 
telecommunications information as the employment of “blanket traffic data retention” 
(Breyer 2005, 1). Alarmingly, he posits that “data retention does not only apply in 
specific cases. Instead, society is being preemptively engineered to enable blanket 
recording of the population’s behavior, when using telecommunications networks” 
(Breyer 2005, 1).  
Sweden has not yet implemented Directive 2006/24/EC. The European 
Commission has since filed a complaint against Sweden for not implementing the 
Directive within the required 18-month timeframe Ricknas 2009). Additionally, in March 
of last year, Germany’s 2007 implementation of the directive was repealed after it was 
successfully challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court as unconstitutional 
(Kartheuser 2010). German carriers were thereafter asked to delete data they have 
collected as the nation now determines how to re-implement the law with amendments. 
Germany’s Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (Working group on data retention) had 
argued that wholesale data collection infringed on the "secrecy of telecommunications 
and the right to informational self-determination", and that data could be used to create 
personality profiles and track people's movements.  It is a hugely controversial directive, 
and so support by all Member States is definitely not all there. Today, the following 
countries have implemented, in part or fully, the Directive: UK, France, Finland, 
Denmark, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, 
Malta, Netherlands, Liechtenstein (non-EU), Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
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Switzerland (non-EU). The following countries have not yet implemented the Directive: 
Germany, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway (Non-EU). 
(Tung 2010).  
 
IV.iii Passenger Name Record Database 
 
The EU also has gained the competency to access passenger name record (PNR) 
data related to travel from the private sector. This data spans to include credit card 
details, dietary requirements, seating, no show, and anything other information that an 
airline may know about passengers. Airlines are required to transfer all PNR to the US 
Department of Homeland Security for all flights to or via the US since 9/11. This initial 
involvement of EU-based airlines spurred the EU to make agreements with the US that 
safeguarded adequate data protection for its EU citizens.  
In a 2004 Directive, the EU established a system requiring airlines to transmit 
passenger data from airlines to Member States’ border authorities (Council Directive 
2004/82/EC 2004). This initial directive regarding passenger data collection was more 
limited than the form we see today: it required a transfer of limited categories that are 
mostly found in one’s own travel documents.  
Thereafter, the Commission tabled a proposal for a framework decision of 
transmission of PNR data for flights going into the EU (Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision 2007). The Annex of the proposal contains the categories of data 
that are to be transferred, and include a list that is very similar to that of the latest EU-US 
PNR Agreement that includes a wide range of data including payment method, time of 
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payment, dietary restrictions, and other “general remarks”. So what is the jump from the 
2004 directive regarding passenger data and the proposed 2007 framework decision? 
Whereas the 2004 directive requires the transmittal of only official information that one 
may find on a passport and therefore other state data systems, the 2007 framework 
decision allows for information that potentially includes a larger scope of personal 
information; it focuses more on profiling with details that say something about a 
passenger’s habits. The Commission’s move to adopt this framework decision takes the 
logic of “an intelligence-led model of border controls very similar to the “border 
security” models in the US and the UK” (Mitselgas 2008, 270). Indeed, the purposes of 
the PNR were explained as not just for border controls and immigration but also for the 
purposes of counter-terrorism and security purposes.  
The data is to be retained for a maximum of no less than 3 years (Art 9). Data is 
transmitted to Passenger Information Units (PIUs) 24 hours before departure (Art 5(3)). 
The passenger data is kept to help identify persons who are, or may be, involved in 
terrorism and organized crime offences as well as their associates, to create and update 
risk indicators for the assessment of such persons, to provide intelligence on travel 
patterns and other trends relating to terrorist offences and organized crime, and to use 
data in criminal investigations and prosecutions (Art 3(5)). From there, data is organized 
and sent to “competent authorities”; as has been noted time and time again, this 
nomination of “competent authorities” is broad, and can include a very large group of 
people at the Member States’ discretion (Art 4(2)). Similar to the case of money 
laundering, the PIUs are established by Member States and there are no detailed rules for 
their establishment.  
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Currently, there are EU PNR agreements with the USA, Canada and Australia, 
which are provisionally acceptable. In May 2010, the European Parliament, under the 
new Treaty rules, postponed its vote for consent for formal conclusion of the EU-US and 
EU-Australia PNR agreements (europa.eu 2010).  
A UK House of Lords Analysis finds that sharing passenger information is not 
proportional to its pursued results. Statewatch asserts that  
“The imbalance between the obligations imposed upon the passengers and the 
invasion of privacy rights of the individual on the one hand, and the objective of 
migration control on the other hand, is massive, particularly because this aspect of 
the proposal appears to apply regardless of nationality since most of the 
passengers affected are EU citizens, who cannot be considered illegal 
immigrants” (Statewatch 8).  
Moreover, the report asserts that this application in the context of a borderless Schengen 
area would “in effect re-introduce border checks through the back door. It would also run 
counter to the main thrust of EU border control in recent years, which has concentrated 
effort on strengthening the external borders of the Union” (Report 2004, 9). The House of 
Lords also finds that “there is no evidence to support the view that the directive is 
necessary to combat organized crime and threats to national security” (Report 2004, 13). 
Rather, the EU government is “focused on creating risk profiles on individuals”, similar 
to its aims for collecting telecommunications records (Report 2004, 13). Proportionality 
as a requisite for the breach of privacy guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR will be discussed 
in full below.  
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CHAPTER V: DATABASES AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH 
FUNDMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
 
V.i  General Laws Pertaining to Data Protection  
 
 In the 1990s, the European Union’s influence in data protection laws had to do 
with market-creating organization and the prevention of abuses by market actors. Since 
the terrorist attacks in New York, and Madrid, cooperation in criminal law enforcement 
has accelerated. Today, the focus of data protection laws is now to protect the privacy of 
its citizens.  
Pre-Lisbon, there was no horizontal instrument that obligated the protection of 
privacy of data in the third pillar. As such, there was fragmentation of data protection 
arrangements, one for each body, and database. With the Lisbon Treaty, Article 16.1 
TFEU establishes a specific provision on a right to data protection. Referring to the 
European Parliament and the Council, this provision reads:  
[that those two bodies must] lay down the rules relating to the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities 
which fall within the scope of Union  law, and the rules relating to the free 
movement of such data (Lisbon Treaty 2007).  
 
In general, the abolition of the pillars with the Lisbon Treaty streamlines the data 
protection process. However, this does not negate the fact that a wide and ever-growing 
area of personal data can be accessed by the EU State, and that the actuality of personal 
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data protection remains precarious. As mentioned before, the lack of a EU-wide criminal 
law system and a lack of a common understanding of databases mean that there is less 
control over the data protection mechanisms.  
Member States have a positive obligation to protect the lives of their citizens as 
per a European Court of Human Rights ruling (Osman v United Kingdom 1998). They 
are obliged to do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and 
immediate risk to the lives of EU citizens of which they have or ought to have 
knowledge. In this sense, the right to security has long been “ codified” as a human right 
in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case-law. In Osman the Court also 
stressed “the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent 
crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which 
legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring 
offenders to justice , including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the 
Convention”. (ECHR Article 8 stipulates the right to respect for private and family life. 
States thus have the difficult job of balancing competing human rights interests with 
international criminal acts. On the one hand, they must protect their population against 
terrorist threats, and on the other, they must safeguard the fundamental rights of 
individuals, including persons suspected or convicted of terrorist activities. 
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Perhaps the most important development under Lisbon is the incorporation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which is based on the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Among the rights guaranteed by the Charter are: one for the respect for 
private and family life, and the other on personal data protection (Art 7, Art 8). The latter 
contains provisions of purpose limitation, fair processing and the rights of access and 
rectification. Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights reads:  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down 
by law. Everyone has the right to access to the data which has been collected 
concerning him and her and the right to have it rectified.  
 Article 8 ECHR further stipulates that any breaches of the rights it guarantees 
must be justified “in accordance with the law” (Article 8(2)). Paragraph 2 of Article 8 
provides that:  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, or the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
 
This justification requires that the breach must have some basis in domestic law. A vague 
and broad general statutory basis is not sufficient. As such, the exchange of information 
between Member States must serve one of the specific interests mentioned, and at the 
same time must not interfere with the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover, 
interference with private life must be proportional. In essence, proportionality requires a 
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balancing exercise. “It is between the nature and extent of the interference and the 
reasons for interfering” (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 84). Proportionality is comprised 
of two elements: search for alternative, less rights-burdensome government means of 
accomplishing the public purpose and an assessment of the importance of the right as 
compared to the public purpose. If this right is sufficiently important in comparison to the 
public interest, and there are alternative means of accomplishing the public purpose, 
proportionality is breached. It must be noted that law enforcement is not an interest or a 
right in itself. If it were, the state would be able to erode human rights on the basis that 
laws are to be enforced. The same applies to other abstract aims, like “criminal justice” or 
the “defense of innocent suspects” (Breyer 2005, 369). Instead, Article 8(2) ECHR 
recognizes the “prevention of…crime” as a legitimate aim. 
 The following broad standards can also be derived from judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights, and are reflected in the case law of the European Court 
of Justice:  
1. the nature of information and intelligence coming from private companies like 
airlines and banks must have additional safeguards in order to ensure the 
accuracy of the information. This is because the data is collected for 
commercial purposes, so it needs safeguards to adapt the information 
appropriately for use in a legal sphere.  
2.  “The collection of data on individuals solely on the basis that they have a 
particular racial origin, particular religious convictions, sexual behavior or 
political opinions or belong to particular movements or organizations which 
are not proscribed by law should be prohibited. The collection of data 
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concerning these factors may only be carried out if absolutely necessary for 
the purposes of a particular inquiry.” (Principle 2.4 of Recommendation 
R(87)15)  
3. EC Directive 95/46/EC stipulates, for the First Pillar, that if a person is 
subjected to a fully-automated decision like that of the retaining of data and 
passing it along to other Member States upon request, the individual should at 
the very least have the right to know the logic involved in this decision, and 
measures of interest that could safeguard the individual’s interest in retaining 
his privacy. The scope and application of this principle is still rather unclear, 
even in the First Pillar. However, the underlying principle - that it would 
violate human identity, dignity or personality to treat anyone on that basis 
without stringent safeguards - must surely also be applied in the Third Pillar. 
This clearly has implications for the kind of “profiling” of terrorist suspects, 
discussed earlier. (The above provisions were adapted from Commissioner for 
Human Rights Hammarberg 2008) 
4. Breyer explains that some have interpreted the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Human Rights as outlawing any exploratory or general surveillance that is not 
conducted on a case-by-case basis in the event of reasonable suspicion 
(Breyer 2005, 368). In its decision on the German G10 Act, the Court of 
Human Rights noted that the Act did not permit “so-called exploratory or 
general surveillance”, (Court of Human Rights, Class et al. v Germany (1978), 
Publications A28 Section 51: “Consequently, so-called exploratory or general 
surveillance is not permitted by the contested legislation”).  
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5. Additionally, there needs to be a requirement that the quality of law in 
question should be accessible by any person. This is so that a concerned 
individual may be enabled to foresee the consequences of the law and adapt 
their conduct accordingly (Breyer 2005, 367). Forseeability implies that the 
law must be distinct and clear in its terms to given individuals an adequate 
indication as to the circumstances that authorities are empowered to act. In 
Malone v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights asserted that 
no right in the Convention can be restricted, unless the citizen knows the basis 
for such interference through domestic law (Xanthanki and Stefanou 2008, 
80). 
 
All of these conditions must be met to maintain a high level of data protection that is 
guaranteed as a fundamental right. Its enshrinement into the Lisbon Treaty makes it of 
significant importance.  
 
 
V.ii The CONS of HAVING a CENTRALIZED DATABASE 
 
V.ii.a. DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION AS INAPPROPRIATE and 
DISPROPORTIONATE 
 
The European Data Protection Supervisor is a recent body that was created in 
2001 to oversee the use of personal data by European Community institutions. It does not 
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have any jurisdiction per se, but it instead provides opinions to be received and respected 
by the European Commission. Their recent opinion on the 2006 Data Retention Directive, 
including their opinion of the usage of database systems, is relevant (EDPS 2011). What 
the EDP emphasized most is the proportionality issue.  To answer whether the use of 
database systems would be proportional, a condition that must be met for the breach of 
the right to privacy, the following questions were addressed: Is there evidence that 
government action can achieve the stated purpose? Is the government action necessary 
for accomplishing the stated purpose or would alternate means accomplish the same 
purpose with a lesser burden on the privacy rights (EDPS, 2011). All data collected must 
be “adequate” and “relevant” to accomplishing the government purpose (Convention 108, 
Art 5, c), and the amount of data processed and the time during which it is stored should 
be no more than what is necessary to accomplish this purpose (Art 5, e). The EDP found 
that on a number of levels, the protections of private information by the Data Retention 
Directive was not enough to provide said proportionality.  
Can data retention, or even the threat thereof, prevent crimes from taking place? 
The likely answer is no. Firstly, it is easy for terrorists to avoid having their 
communications recorded. They could use peer-to-peer technologies, internet cafes, or 
anonymous proxies, etc. to avoid the communications monitoring. Heinz Kiefer is the 
president of Eurocop (European Confederation of Police), and in a press statement, he 
admitted: 
"It remains easy for criminals to avoid detection through fairly simple means, for 
example mobile phone cards can be purchased from foreign providers and 
frequently switched. The result would be that a vast effort is made with little 
effect on criminals and terrorists than to slightly irritate them. Activities like these 
are unlikely to boost citizens’ confidence in the EU’s ability to deliver solutions 
to their demand for protection against serious crime and terrorism” (Breyer 2005).  
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Secondly, though data retention is seen as necessary by government officials mainly to 
combat terrorism, data retention cannot realistically stop an attack from happening. At 
best, it is possible for that data to assist the police in finding the culprits and their 
accomplices after the attack has taken place. As such, the cost of the loss of privacy from 
millions of people is not proportionate to the gains in stopping terrorist attacks. It is 
understandable for a few exceptional people should have their data stored and shared 
between competent EU Member State authorities; but a blanket data retention on all EU 
citizens presents huge costs for individual privacy with apparently smaller gains for 
fighting crime. 
There is an even more troubling aspect of centralized data retention. These 
technologies are used more and more frequently, but should not be depended upon. 
Commissioner Hammarberg explains that these technologies that result in “profiling” 
may only work up until a point, but still have a huge and inevitable margin of error that 
will cost the privacy of innocent people unjustly.  Hammarberg writes:  
Attempts to identify very rare incidents or targets from a very large data set are 
mathematically certain to result in either an unacceptably high numbers of “false 
positives” (identifying innocent people as suspects) or an unacceptably low number 
of “false negatives” (not identifying real criminals or terrorists). As a very recent, 
authoritative study by the US’ National Research Council (the US National 
Academies) concluded: 
Automated identification of terrorists through data mining (or any other known 
methodology) is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of 
technology development efforts (Hammarberg 2008, 3).  
 
 In January, 2011, a private rights group in Germany called AK Vorrat was also 
concerned for the security of the privacy rights of German citizens after several EU 
Directives regarding data retention were incorporated into German national law. They 
conducted their own analysis, which suggested the loss of data retention will make little 
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practical difference to police. The study found that while data retention was in operation, 
more serious criminal acts (2009: 1,422,968) were reported to police than before (2007: 
1,359,102) but a smaller proportion were resolved. In 2009 76.3 per cent of serious crime 
were cleared up compared to 77.6 per cent in 2007, before the introduction of the blanket 
retention of communications data rules in 2008 (Leyden 2011). Similarly, after the 
additional retention of internet traffic data began in 2009, the number of recorded internet 
offences increased from 167,451 in 2008 to 206,909 in 2009. The clear-up rate for 
internet crime fell from 79.8 per cent in 2008 down to 75.7 per cent in 2009 (Leyden 
2011). As such, data retention is not necessary, especially when considering the costs of 
fundamental rights to EU citizens. Ak Vorrat also believes that the blanket retention has 
caused criminals to use other means, which results in targeted investigation techniques 
that were normally used in the past can no longer be used today. “This avoidance 
behavior can not only render retained data meaningless but also frustrate more targeted 
investigation techniques…Overall, blanket data retention can thus be counterproductive 
to criminal investigations” (Leyden 2011). Of course, this is only true for Germany, and 
so this non-correlation cannot be assumed for all countries in the EU, though it is highly 
likely there are similar trends throughout the EU Member States. If data retention is 
indeed ineffective, and might even aggravate usual investigative techniques, the scales 
are tipped even further into the direction of unproportionality. Blanket data retention is 
inadequate in the test of proportionality.  
 The Opinion on the Data Retention Directive also maintains that the necessity of 
data retention as provided for it the Data Retention Directive has not sufficiently been 
demonstrated. Under Article 8(2) of the Convention of Human Rights, breaches of 
  83
privacy are allowed when the measure is necessary for achieving the legitimate aim. It is 
arguable if data retention is really necessary, as a proposal for the Directive claims “to 
meet the generally recognized objectives of preventing and combating crime and 
terrorism” (COM 2005, 3.). There has been no evidence, though, that data retention has 
proved to be a necessary investigative tool. In fact, according to the EDPS, the Directive 
has regulated data retention “in a way which goes beyond what is necessary” (COM 
2005, 11).  
 Another requirement under Article 8(2) is the necessity of foreseeability. It has 
also been underlined by the Court of Justice in its Österreichischer Rundfunk ruling that 
the law should be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizens to adjust 
their conduct accordingly (edps.europa.eu 2011). However, because the way in which the 
directive will be implemented in each Member State lies primarily with how the 
authorities in each Member define “serious crime”, and because Member States have 
differing legal traditions and practices in general, there is no foreseeability in the case of 
data retention.  
 The Data Retention Directive as it is written also has some notable weaknesses. 
The ICO points out specifically that some measures aimed at providing transparency 
through better notification are ineffective. One such example is the ineffectiveness of 
fulfilling the Directive’s Article 10 and 11, which obligate the provision of information to 
the data subject. Such privacy policies are provided so that the data subject to aware that 
his data is being collected, and can check and verify the information. The ICO asserts, 
though, that these mechanisms fall short of actually helping the affected people 
understand their rights.  
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The evidence suggests that their use is predominantly targeted to meet any 
applicable legal transparency requirement, rather than serving a real transparency 
benefit towards the consumer. Privacy policies are written by lawyers, for 
lawyers, and appear to serve little useful purpose for the data subject due to their 
length, complexity and extensive use of legal terminology… The end result is that 
privacy policies are not read. Companies have evidence indicating that few 
consumers access privacy policies (Robinson 2009, 29-30).  
 
The provisions set up fall short of the requirements needed in order to legitimate a breach 
of privacy as established in Article 8.2.  
 
V.ii.b A GROWING GOVERNMENT CULTURE OF INTELLEGENCE 
GATHERING 
 
The increase in ways for a centralized mechanism to collect data has undoubtedly 
changed the culture of policing and political policy in the EU. With abilities akin to 
surveillance powers afforded to centralized powers, and “partly incited by the media, an 
undercurrent of insecurity and fear has established itself” (Breyer 2005, 2). This is 
problematic because this undercurrent does not actually correlate with an increase of 
crime rates. With the proliferation a culture used to surveillance, it is undoubted that this 
undercurrent will not reverse. 
The EU continues to attempt to amass huge amounts of personal data, making its 
functionality in this way similar to a police state; however, recent court decisions have 
shown that this action goes against rights provided by the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Specifically, in a December 2008 case, two British men who were never 
convicted of a crime came to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that their 
DNA and fingerprints should not be retained by UK police as per Article 8 of the 
  85
European Convention on Human Rights (bbc.co.uk 2008). The Court found in favor of 
the two plaintiffs, citing breaches of the right to a private life. The ECHR said it was 
“struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of retention in England and 
Wales”; the article relates that of about 4.5 million people from which personal data is 
placed into a database, about one in five of them does not have a current criminal record.  
Though this is just one case, there are doubtful hundreds if not thousands more that are 
having their privacy breached inappropriately given the culture of data retention by 
European police forces that is practiced and spreading.  
Another issue that pertains to the growing intelligentsia behaviors of the state 
police forces is the possibility that data retention may be abused by the police to monitor 
activities of any group that may come into conflict with the state, even those who are 
engaged in legal protests. The UK police have been found to have used anti-terrorism 
powers against groups opposed to the war in Iraq, for example (bbc.co.uk 2003). It is not 
necessarily the collection of each piece of data, but rather how each piece could 
potentially be used by the law enforcement. As Germany’s Arbeitskreis 
Virratsdatenspeicherung states, “Even though the storage does not extend to the contents 
of the communications, these data may be used to draw content-related conclusions that 
extend into the users' private sphere” (Federal Constitutional Court 2010. In other words, 
the EU could create files based solely on circumstantial evidence; by permitting detailed 
information to be obtained on social or political affiliations and on personal preferences 
etc, there is a presupposed and inappropriate equivocation while making on file on 
someone. Of course, given the differing cultures regarding criminology in each Member 
State, personal data could further be used in a wide variety of ways that do not 
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necessarily correlate with their intended purpose. An overarching system of criminal law 
would only provide enough clarity on how the data should legitimately be used.  
This problem is demonstrated by the perceptions noted above in the February 
2008 Eurobarometer study: 64% of data subjects question whether organizations that held 
their personal data handled this data appropriately, and 84% of data controllers were in 
favor of more harmonized rules on security measures to improve and simplify 
implementation of the legal framework on data protection, with only 5% of data 
controllers believing that existing legislation was fit to handle the increasing amount of 
personal information being exchanged (Robinson 2009, 39). Clearly, there is some 
question as to the effectiveness of existing rules that are in place to adequately protect 
private data of EU citizens.  
 
 
V.ii.c THE CONFUSIONS INCITED WHEN DEALING WITH A MYRIAD OF 
DATABASES 
 
Though the 2000 Mutual Legal Assistance Convention and its 2001 Protocol are 
mechanisms that aid in implementing a precise procedure and guidelines to be followed 
by Member States when sending and servicing mutual legal assistance, it has not been 
signed by a considerable amount of Member States (Convention of 29 May 2000 on 
mutual assistance in criminal matters between the member states, OJ C 197, 12 July 
2000, p1, and OJ C 326, 21 November 2001, adapted from Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 
4). The 2000 MLA Convention has not been ratified by Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, and 
  87
Luxembourg. The Protocol has not been ratified by Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Portugal (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 9-10). This has 
consequences: in 2005 alone, 155 requests for mutual legal assistance were not addressed 
by the procedures found in the 2000 MLA Convention and its Protocol because the 
requesting Member States have omitted to ratify those two instruments (Xanthaki and 
Stefanou 2008, 10). There is thus relative weakness in the reality of mutual legal 
assistance and equal treatment of the databases within the EU Member States.  
 At the international level, all Member States are signatories to the European 
Convention of 20 April 1959 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Additional 
Protocol of 17 March 1978 to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance on 
Criminal Matters, the Convention of 19 June 1990 implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985 on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Common Borders, and the 
2001 Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters (Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 5). Moreover, there are Benelux 
Conventions and Nordic Conventions on legal assistance. The myriad of international 
agreements often causes confusion and difficulty for mutual legal assistance. It is 
especially different when one takes into account that the information requested is needed 
rather urgently. For example, though the 1959 Convention excludes fiscal military and 
political offences, these are covered by the 1972 Protocol and the Schengen Convention 
(Xanthaki and Stefanou 2008, 6). The authorities can less appropriately use data from the 
myriad of databases still, making the breach on individual fundamental rights even more 
unsuitable.  
 It should be kept in mind that personal data centrally collected is additionally 
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sometimes transferred to countries outside the EU. This can raise a number of questions 
because the level of protection of personal data outside the EU can sometimes be lower. 
The Commission maintains a list of third countries where the level of protection of 
personal data is considered to be in line with EU rules on data protection, to where 
personal data may be transferred without additional safeguards into countries with even 
more disparate views on databases. Transfers of personal data to all other countries may 
only take place if the EU exporter provides for the adequate protections of rights, in 
particular through special contracts between the EU exporter and the foreign importer 
which will receive and process the data in compliance with EU rules (Commission Staff 
Working Document, 2010, 16).  
 
 
V.iv The PROS of HAVING a CENTRALIZED DATABASE 
 
An independent international research team led by RAND Europe called the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has listed the strengths of the current Data 
Retention Directive as: serving as a reference model for good practice; harmonizing data 
protection principles and to a certain extent enabling an internal market for personal data; 
having flexibility; being technology neutral; improving awareness of data protection 
concerns (Robinson 2009).  
Personal data can be used to benefit society as a whole in select instances. The 
ICO also reports that the public sector increasingly uses personal information in 
databases to improve public services such as tax administration and social security 
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provision that better the lives of EU citizens. A good example of the way in which 
governments are looking to tailor services to the citizen include the UK’s 
Transformational Government Initiative. Personal data is also being increasingly used in 
healthcare (particularly research and large-scale epidemiological studies) and socio-
economic research.  (Robinson 2009, 12) However, this does not account for the breaches 
on privacy by any means, especially when balancing these positives in relation to the 
negatives and weighing out proportionality. The EU’s use of databases is an egregious 
breach of fundamental rights, and so it should be amended or repealed.  
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CHAPTER VI: Overall Assessment and Conclusion 
 
With the inappropriate access to data retention systems aside, it is necessary to 
assess the EU’s hold of the several areas of criminal competence in general. The 
following chapter is meant to provide a clear summary of the both the main negative and 
positive consequences of having a EU criminal law program. Though quantity and 
quality of criminal matters that the EU currently has competence over is problematic, as 
well as the disconnected nature of those competences, I believe that the EU should enjoy 
some criminal law competence to combat transnational crimes that aversely affect the 
Euro and EU’s internal market, as well as help produce a general feeling of symbolic 
Community.  
 
 
VI.i Negative Consequences 
 
 
Though those in favor of developing criminal legislation further often argue that 
criminal competence is a means to an end, critics of developing criminal harmonization 
further argue that criminal law must always be treated as a special case; it needs definite 
and distinct scrutinizing since criminal law is often what defines a nation’s culture. It 
needs to be commonly understood by all those that are subject to it; this is not the case for 
EU criminal competence.  Some critics’ specific arguments take the following logic. 
They argue that criminal law is inextricably linked with state sovereignty and deals with 
sensitive areas such as the relationship between the individual and the state. Also, 
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criminal law development in the EU has generally led to more regressive rather than 
progressive environments for their citizens. They also argue that any conferral of 
competence in criminal matters by Member States to the Community should be express 
in the Treaties, and not subject simply to creative rulings of the ECJ. Finally, they argue 
that intervention in criminal matters does not sit well with the character of the 
Community as a primarily economic space.  
It is useful to consider some theory when reading the contestations for community 
criminal law competence. Groning asks the question of what kind of criminal system 
does a society ideally want. She asserts in theoretical terms that the “legitimacy of 
criminal law should be measured in relation to the basic normative principles of the 
democratic Rechtsstaat, centered on the idea of individual autonomy, and the state is but 
a means to uphold that principle” (Groning 2011, 125). In order to achieve this, a 
criminal law system should take the constitutional framework of the principles of ultimo 
ratio seriously, be minimalistic, and promote practices in favor of the autonomy of the 
individual (Groning 2011, 125).  
 The right to punish is the essence of state power, so to alter the way in which the 
state punishes its people is to change the essence of its power. As Linda Groning puts it: 
“The ordering of the exercise of public penal power in precisely a (national) criminal 
justice system is considered necessary in order to secure the basic values of the 
democratic Rechsstaat (Rechsstaat being the constitutional paradigm of western states 
that combines democratic majority rule with constitutional protection of individual rights) 
(Groning 2011, 115-6). And in this reading, it is not possible to say that the EU practices 
necessary to promote individual autonomy since it is not minimilastic, and often 
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impinges on the autonomy of the individual. It will not be possible to promote autonomy 
of the individual, though, if there is a not a strict and widespread understood notion of 
what the criminal law competence of the EU subjects the individual to. 
 
 
VI.i.a Sharp Differences between the legal traditions of Member States 
 
 Firstly, the differences between the Member States’ legislation on penalties are 
still quite sharp, indicating not just that successful harmonization is unlikely, but 
probably unwanted. There are historical, cultural and legal reasons for the differences in 
their legal systems which have evolved over time. Each Member State’s treatment of 
criminal law is an expression of the way in which Member States have faced and 
answered fundamental questions about criminal law, choices that were shaped by each 
Member State’s own historical trajectory. These systems have their own internal 
coherence, and amending individual rules without regard to the overall picture would risk 
generating distortions and creating unequal treatment under Community law for EU 
citizens.  
The problem of asymmetry addresses the fact that each Member State has a 
different system of national criminal law that is not easily reconcilable to form one 
system. The combination of a centralized legislator and decentralized negotiation and 
administration of that punishment is not compatible with the idea that the citizens should 
be equally protected under the criminal justice system. For example, there is the risk that 
the courts of different Member States will interpret common rules in different ways. 
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There is both unequal treatment of those who are charged with EU crimes, and a risk on 
the horizontal level, of unequal protection of the EU citizens against crime. Member 
States determine a lot of their own general rules and principles and so there are 
substantial normative gaps. In May 2011, UK Justice Secretary Ken Clarke, too, has 
commented on the how unrealistic having a “one size fits all” approach to criminal law is. 
He says that  
“A preoccupation with imposing a single, inflexible, codified data protection 
regime on the whole of the European Union, regardless of the different cultures 
and different legal systems, carries with it serious risks…Let us keep the broad 
principles of the existing Directive and better understand the 27 laws we all in our 
nation states have, rather than setting out to create in detail an additional 28th 
radically different, and artificial new set of laws” (theregister.co.uk 2011).  
 
Combating racism and xenophobia is one particular field of EU criminal 
harmonization that has been contested and resulted in long debates; this is exemplary of 
the disparate philosophies on criminal law that each Member State has, and just why it is 
so difficult to reach a harmonized approach. As previously mentioned, Article 29 TEU 
has “preventing and combating racism and xenophobia” as one of the mechanisms to 
allow for a “high level of safety”. However, different Member States disagree to the 
extent to which such conduct should be criminalized (Mitselgas 2008, 98). With the 
Community under the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States adopted a Joint Action 
“concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia” in 1996 (96/443/JHA, OJ L185, 24 
July 1996, p5.) The joint action defined racism as and xenophobia as:  
(a) public incitement to discrimination, violence or racial hatred in respect of a 
group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to coulor, 
race, religion, or national or ethnic origin;  
(b) public condoning, for racist or xenophobic purposes, of crimes against 
humanity and human rights violations;  
(c) public denial of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 April 
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1945 insofar as its includes behavior which is contemptuous of, or degrading 
to, a group of persons defined by reference to color, race, religion, or national 
or ethnic origin;  
(d) public dissemination or distribution of tracts, pictures or other material 
containing expressions of racism and xenophobia;  
(e) participation in the activities of groups, organizations or associations, which 
involve discrimination, violence, or racial, ethnic or religious hatred. (Title I, 
(a, adapted from Mistelgas 2008, 98).  
 
Instead of criminalizing racism as defined in the joint action, there was introduced the 
obligation for Member States to ensure “effective judicial cooperation”, by either 
criminalizing the behavior or by derogating from the principle of dual criminality (Title 
1a). Obviously this leaves a lot of room for Member States to act; the obligations of the 
text are vague and thus relatively weak. Member States inserted their own declarations 
and qualifications where it saw fit. The UK, for example, stated that it would only apply 
the obligations “where the relevant behavior is threatening, abusive, or insulting and is 
carried out with the intention of stirring up racial hatred or is likely to do so” (Annex, 
Declaration 3, adapted from Mitselgas 2008, 99). Other Member States interpreted the 
joint action differently.  
Thereafter, Commission tabled a proposal for a framework decision to replace the 
1996 Joint Action (Mitselgas 2008, 99). It aimed at making the same racist and 
xenophobic conduct punishable in all Member States under a common criminal law 
approach. This list of offences was expanded, and common definitions and penalties were 
introduced. Member States were concerned, and rightly so, that this would not be easily 
successful and effective given the diversity of Member States’ approaches to racism and 
xenophobia. The UK, for example, were opposed to their having to change their domestic 
law to be amended to include the criminalization of incitement to religious hatred, which 
is an issue that was quite controversial there for much of its history as an independent 
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country (Mitselgas 2008, 99). In general, Member States reacted negatively to being 
required to change the criminal law, which would essentially require a change in their 
legal traditions and legal philosophies regarding racism. Finally, in 2007, a “general 
approach” on the text of the framework decision was accepted (Doc. 8665/07). There are 
exceptions that address national sensitivities. With regard to criminalization at a national 
level, a UK-inspired exception states that Member States:  
May choose to punish only conduct which is either carried out in a manner likely 
to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusing or insulting, as well as that 
the reference to religion is intended to cover at least ‘conduct which is a pretext 
for direction acts against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined 
by reference to race, coulour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’. (Arts 1a and 
1b respectively, adapted from Mistilegas 2008, 99).  
 
This ensured that the UK would not have to change domestic criminal law. However, 
“from a harmonization point of view…this may not lead to optimal solutions, in 
particular for those hoping that the Framework Decision would create a level of legal 
certainty and common understanding” (Mitselgas 2008, 100). It is clear that there is 
always at play a fine balance between Community criminal legislation effectiveness and 
state sovereignty.  
This discussion on the Member States’ efforts to harmonize anti-racism and anti-
xenophobia measures is intended to show how different Member States’ philosophies 
regarding their own legal traditions are. Not only does this make it very difficult to 
harmonize criminal law on a community-wide level, but it also begs the question as to 
whether such harmonization and loss of culture is wanted. There are numerous other 
examples of similar difficulties in successful harmonization that would ensure equal 
treatment under the law; for example, different Member States define “organized crime” 
differently.   
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VI.i.B Increasing Power without the Express Rights in the Treaties 
 
 The manner in which Community criminal competence sprung forth is also an 
area of concern for some critics. What must be noted is the fact that there is no historical 
precedent of building a supranational criminal law system that is supplemental to those 
nation’s own criminal law programs. It sprang forth purely from the Community’s 
creative judgments and self-allotted powers. This was the focus of the earlier section 
examining how ambiguities between the first and third pillar resulted in the ECJ’s 
landmark judgments that allowed for the Community to have competence over previously 
housed third pillar issues.  
Critics also point to the erratic nature of the European Council’s legislative and 
policy programmes that are enacted in light of current events. The 1999 Tampere 
European Council Conclusions, followed by the 2004 Hague Programme’s content is 
heavily influenced by external world environment. The EU of the 2000s was threatened 
by terrorism, which led the European Council react swiftly in response. Mitselgas notes 
that the “terrorism rationale has justified and led to the adoption of 
measures…disparate….” (Mitselgas 2008, 33). The blurring of pillars resulted in 
important ramifications regarding accountability and judicial control; their swift action is 
troubling in terms of European Council transparency and a lack of debate and discussion 
as well as a lack of guarantee for labored and detailed analysis of possible consequences 
of action that is especially necessary when trying to harmonize the law between such 
differing countries.  
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Another troubling quality that is cited by opponents is the fact that EU Criminal law 
is not based on harmonization, but rather on mutual recognition. This means that national 
criminal justice systems potentially have to change substantially to fit the model of 
Community criminal law. Instead of deliberated and well-organized development, EU 
criminal law is enacted when and to what extent it is needed by the maximal, not minimal 
player. This causes huge discrepancies within the system from one Member State to 
another.  
 
VI.i.c Community Criminal Law as Repressive, and not Rights-Giving  
 
Oftentimes, the Community will claim their criminal law initiatives are pushed 
forward in order to benefit citizens; in other words, that these initiatives will necessarily 
give rights rather than take them away. However, when examining some initiatives, it is 
difficult to say whether this is actually so. For example, two measures based on the 
principle of mutual recognition in particular that claim to benefit the defendant expose 
some aims of the supranationalization forces. The two cases are the enforcement order 
and the probation order; both have the claim of securing enhanced prospects of the 
sentenced person’s being integrated into society, thus being a benefit to the defendant 
(Recital 9 of the Enforcement order and Recital 8 of the Probation order.) The 
enforcement order was initiated to facilitate the serving of sentences in East European 
Member States that would have otherwise been served in West European Member States. 
Given the inferior and often inhumane conditions in several East European prisons, the 
argument that this measure is to benefit the prisoner is unlikely. Furthermore, the 
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enforcement order circumscribes the requirement of prisoner’s consent, which is 
supposed to be guaranteed in the 1983 Council of European Convention on the transfer of 
sentenced persons (Wagner 2010, 12). This is problematic for the outlook of the future of 
mutual recognition in criminal law cooperation. The push to attain “mutual recognition” 
has hampered the balance between law enforcement and individual rights that has been 
explicitly desired by Member States. As Wagner further states:  
European criminal law cooperation has privileged law enforcement over individual 
rights because the adoption of repressive measures has been eased by the principle 
of mutual recognition whereas the introduction of common standards of defendants’ 
rights has been hampered by unanimity in the Council (Wagner 2010, 13).  
 
As mentioned above, this leads critics of some Member States to become weary, and less 
likely to advance the principle of mutual trust that is needed in order to ensure the 
principle of mutual recognition. It is contradictory in its expectations. Common standards 
are thus even more difficult to attain.  
 Another area of criticism is that EU criminal law development has led to overall 
repression, rather than right gaining for EU citizens. Takis Tridimas zeros-in on a quality 
of the development of EU criminal law that is at odds with the classic integration model. 
He explains that “traditionally, Community law has led to the erosion of national 
sovereignty through granting rights to citizens. Integration through law has always been 
rights-focused. This paradigm appears to be reversed in the field of criminal law where 
emphasis lies firmly in facilitating the exercise of the state powers rather than in 
bestowing rights” (my emphasis added, foreward to Mitselgas text book, v). For example, 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights was established to safeguard the rights of EU citizens 
ensuring the protection of rights. The development of Criminal Law in the EU, by 
contrast, has allowed the Community powers to withhold rights that were previously 
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granted in a Member State setting. The most potent examples are the correlated rights of 
data protection and privacy.  
Though it is somewhat of a simplification, the following figure shows how much 
framework decisions have influenced the legislation of the following Nordic Countries’ 
national criminal programs. Introduced framework decisions that aimed at approximation 
of substantial criminal law have often led to either criminalizing nationally more acts 
(called new-criminalization) or to an upward adjustment of penalties and penalty scales 
(up-criminalization). This is indicative of a very problematic feature of EU criminal law: 
it often requires more constriction and repression, instead of allowing for more rights, 
protections, etc. Elholm states that “I have found no examples of de-or down-
criminalization in the Nordic countries of framework decisions” (Elholm, 212). In the 
following figure, a * represents “new-criminalization”, and a + represents “up-
criminalization”. (Adapted from Elholm 2009, 194-203).  
FRAMEWORK DECISIONS OVERVIEW:  
Framework 
Decisions Related 
Legislation 
Denmark Finland Sweden 
Counterfeiting * * */+ 
Non-Cash Means 
of Payment 
 *  
Money Laundering * */+  
Terrorism + */+ */+ 
Trafficking in + */+ */+ 
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Human Beings 
Unathorised Entry */+ */+ */+ 
Corruption  *  
Sexual 
Exploitation of 
Children 
*/+ */+ + 
Drug Trafficking + * * 
Information */+ + * 
Ship Shource 
Pollution 
+ + + 
Enviornment  *  
Organized Crime   * 
Racism  */+  
 
Elholm makes an interesting finding regarding the consequences of framework decision 
approximation in national legislation is that of “over-criminalization”. By this he means 
Member States often up- or new-criminalize without necessarily having to according to 
the framework decisions (Elholm 2009, 213). This is mostly due to a national policy and 
ideology that is difficult to harmonize with the result requirements from the EU acts. For 
example, there is over-criminalization because of legal-technical reasons; it may be 
necessary to rewrite the constituent elements of the framework decision so that the 
wording complies with the national legislation technique and language. There is a risk 
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that more things are criminalized than is necessary by the EU Framework Decisions 
(Elholm 2009, 213).  
 Moreover, there is an imbalance between the horizontal and vertical aspect of EU 
criminal law. There is more focus on efficient crime control than on the control of public 
penal power. For example, the push to develop of European prosecutor’s office has had 
no equivalent for a common defense structure, like a “Eurodefender” or something in that 
logic.  
VI.i.d PRIVACY LOSS 
 
 
 EU individuals’ privacy loss is not proportional to the gains of combating criminal 
law. It is therefore the number one problem of the data retention trends that result from 
pooling together criminal law competence to the EU. Indeed, in the most recent 2011 
Evaluation report from the Commission to the Council and the EP in the Data Retention 
Directive, section I.2.6 reads: “the Retention of telecommunications data clearly 
constitutes an interference with the right to privacy of the persons concerned as laid down 
by Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and Article 7 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (edsp.europa.eu 2011). The EDSP has deemed this 
opinion regarding the Directive as “the moment of truth for the Data Retention Directive” 
(I.2.11). 
 In general terms, there are direct and indirect forms of damage due to privacy loss 
that may have consequences on individuals. Van der Hoeven proposes a classification of 
three types of harm that may arise as a result of the compromise of privacy protections 
(adapted from Robinson 2009):  
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1. Information based harm – there are increased instances of identity theft, but this 
category can include any type of harm that is possible following the acquisition of 
private and personal data, even including negative feelings of mistrust of the 
government, etc. According to the Home Office the cost of identity theft to the 
United Kingdom economy was £1.7bn6.  
2. Information injustice – information that is presented in one text is used 
inappropriately in another. This is expected, and indeed often occurs, with the 
sharing of information between different Member States which have differing 
philosophies of criminality, where information presented in one context is used in 
another. Other examples include the mistaken detention on the basis of erroneous 
or inaccurate personal information, as occurred with the US lawyer Brandon 
Mayfield who was imprisoned for two weeks by the US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in June 2004 following a match between his fingerprints with 
those found in the Madrid terrorist bombing. 
3. Restriction of moral autonomy – people fear the omnipresence and pervasiveness 
of having their personal data taken, and analyzed by the government. This may 
lead to people feeling restricted or limited in expressing their opinions or their 
ability to self-represent own identity to the public.  
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VI.ii: Positive Consequences of Having a Centralized Community Criminal 
Framework 
 
 Article 29 TEU expresses the vision of EU cooperation as the creation of an area 
of freedom, security and justice. The attainment of this area will allow for an internal 
market to thrive. To achieve this, the Community says, is necessary a mutual 
approximation of rules on criminal matters in each and all of the Member States. The 
community deems the creation of various framework decisions to be appropriate to 
prevent and combat international crimes by the provision of three arguments. First, the 
Community holds that there should be no gaps or loopholes in the EU in which criminal 
acts are unpunished or punished lightly. It is in these gaps or loopholes that crime will 
spread to the rest of the EU via the open inner borders. This is why harmonization in 
certain criminal matters is a must. This is the argument of prevention of crimes in the 
Community.  
 A second argument explains that Community criminal legislation is necessary 
because it is not possible for police, prosecution authorities, and courts of justice to stick 
to national procedures of the court while EU criminals and criminality move at a larger 
scale. This is because differences in substantive criminal law are potential obstacles to 
effective investigation and prosecution across borders. An example of such an obstacle is 
a requirement of double criminality, which blocks legal cross-country assistance. Another 
is a potential low level of penalty in one country because lack of coercive measures like 
extradition of confiscation that are present in another Member State. There are dozens of 
other examples of potential obstacles. In addition, an approximation of the substantive 
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criminal law will increase mutual trust among the countries, making it more likely to 
work together efficiently, according to the Commission. This is the argument of 
preventing problems of differences in prosecution within the Community.  
 Aside from these baseline arguments, the most important consideration that 
pushed forward the communitarization of criminal law is that the maintenance of the 
economy must be put first. The criminal sanctions imposed on the economy, such as 
money-laundering and insider-trading, relate mostly to the maintenance of trust in a 
functioning capital market. Not only is this essential for fair competition within the EU, 
but also ensures that foreign investors trust in a functioning environment in which they 
can properly invest. Albrecht agrees with the stance that criminal law has been furthered 
in the EU primarily as a way to protect the economy. She states:  
Criminal law serves as a means for the bureaucratic organization of economic 
interests and is designed to suit the needs of the capital markets. Its legitimation, 
therefore, results from its effectiveness in serving economic goals…Integration 
through criminal law amounts to no more than the administrative attempt to make 
the movement of capital manageable (Albrecht 1999, 305).  
 
In the above quote, she stresses the bureaucratic elements of Community criminal law. 
Basically, the European Commission asserts its responsibility over the EU economy by 
defining its role in criminal law. Criminal law is one element in the political 
administrative organization of a single market.  
 EU criminal law legislation also helps ensure there will not be jurisdictional 
conflicts regarding the principle of ne bis in idem. This principle represents the idea that 
no one shall be liable to be tried or punished twice for an offence for which he or she has 
already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law. This is incredibly 
important, and has sometimes even been incorporated into the Constitution of a nation; it 
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is indeed included in the US constitution in the 5th Amendment as a constitutional right, 
for example. Especially within the EU, transnational crime has been growing as a 
consequence of the internal market, among other factors. In cases where more than one 
state may enforce jurisdiction, conflicts of jurisdiction are likely to emerge and these can 
have significant consequences for the states and the individual involved. Different legal 
traditions may understand this concept of ne bis in idem differently, though. Different 
types of legal action and different types of offences are possible when comparing the 
actual meaning of ne bis in idem.  
 Several provisions have thus been established that refer to the issue in order to 
prevent fragmentation of viewpoints on ne bis in idem. One such provision of ne bis in 
idem is offered by articles 54 to 58 on the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, which was incorporated into EU third pillar law after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. These articles introduce a transnational version of the principle, meaning 
that each of the contracting parties have agreed to recognize the principle in the same 
way. Additionally, the principle has been included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and in the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (Hollander 2008, 65). 
This is a positive for the proper functioning of the law and equal treatment of EU 
citizens; it would be even better if such a commitment to understanding harmonized 
requirements were in place for more issues pertaining to criminal law competences of the 
EU.  
 A community criminal law agenda works to positively enforce an explicit code of 
symbols and signals that ensures effectiveness in the eyes of EU citizens. It is the EU’s 
wish to appear as an international organization with a “nation state character” in order to 
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appear strong on the world political stage. Criminal law can oftentimes be considered as 
the foundation stone in the sovereignty of an independent nation, and the regulation of 
punishment is therefore connected with a certain symbolic value. For example, in the 
Commission Communication of the Green Paper on the approximation, mutual 
recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the EU, the introductory portion 
sets up a symbolic objective. The Commission explains that “by defining common 
[offences and] penalties in relation to certain kinds of crime, the Union would be putting 
out a symbolic message” which will among other things “help give the general public a 
shared sense of justice” and to express that “certain forms of conduct are unacceptable” 
(p9). The Commission sets out to establish that the regulation will create a future shared 
sense of justice by explicitly stating that it should be acceptable by all those in the 
Community that certain offences are abhorrent to the Community (all the above adapted 
from Elholm 2009, 224). It creates a sense of unity for these Community members. 
Moreover, it helps rationalize the need further commitments in the areas of economics, 
politics, external action, etc; to cooperate on criminal matters is exemplary of an 
independent nation speaking with one voice.  
 Elholm also explains how the enactment of Community criminal laws can help 
elicit a unifying implicit sense of symbols and signals which speak to the political wishes 
of European Union. For example, it is the Community’s wish to be active and efficient. 
An example of EU criminal legislation with this more implicit message is the Framework 
Decision on Unauthorized Entry. This Framework Decision was passed after a tragic and 
horrible incident at Dover in which over 50 Chinese refugees were found suffocated in a 
container after an attempt to enter Great Britain illegally (Elhorn 2009, 225). In response, 
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the Community sounded the attack against smuggling people and demanded extended 
penalties for this type of crime all over the EU.  
On the other side of the balance from the necessity to protect individual rights is 
the necessity to protect the common good. This is what has pushed forward the 
harmonization of criminal legislation in the European Union. Simply put, the world 
climate produces common problems that necessitate cooperation.  
 
VI.iii CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, the necessity to preserve the EU’s internal market makes 
cooperation on criminal matters self-evident. However, the extent that that cooperation 
allows for far-reaching Community competence is questionable. To improve the quality 
of the EU criminal legislation, there unquestionably needs to be more of a common 
understand of the terms and conditions that make up the legislation. This is necessary to 
help ensure that the Community laws are interpreted similarly to ameliorate the equal 
treatment of EU citizens under that law.  
The most questionable of the competences is the legality of the Data Retention 
Directive, and the overall use of centralized databases in the general. This has become the 
general attitude of the EU Member States in the past year or two. Germany, especially, 
has taken a strong stance against the allowance of EU Data Retention requirements. This 
can be seen with Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 
2010 overturning the Data Retention Directive because they deemed it unconstitutional. 
Additionally, the latest June 2011 statistics published by German police have shown that 
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telecommunications data protection has had no positive impact on the number of cases 
solved (Baker 2011). This and similar publications, along with a shifting attitude towards 
the world climate and the fight on terrorism in general, will either cause the 2006 Data 
Retention Directive to be either amended or repealed completely. It is unlikely, 
unwanted, and unlawful for the EU to continue to amass and share the personal data of 
potentially any and all of its 500 million citizens without concrete evidence that its 
positives for public good and the prevention of crime outweigh its negatives of 
encroaching fundamental rights. At this point, there is no evidence to prove that.  
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